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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs to enhance its capabilities for 
safeguarding spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stored in dry cask storage facilities and for 
maintaining persistent continuity of knowledge (CoK) about it. The current safeguards 
approach relies heavily upon containment and surveillance measures, where seals are 
placed inside and outside the dry cask. The disadvantage of this approach is that, if a seal 
is broken, no method currently exists to verify the dry cask content other than opening it 
and checking the internal seal and the SNF inside. This is a costly and difficult activity. 
Thus other measures need to be developed. This study focused on the development of a 
remote monitoring system (RMS) for dry cask storage which is capable of detecting 
neutron and gamma radiation emitted by the SNF and the signal thus generated can then 
be continually transmitted to the IAEA to maintain the CoK about the dry cask content. 
The remote option was chosen after reviewing the current IAEA needs. 
A computational approach was used to develop the proposed RMS. 
Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code (MCNP) was employed to develop a dry cask 
model with 32 SNF assemblies inside. The ORIGEN-ARP, fuel burn-up and depletion 
code, was used to generate a radiation source-term. A series of MCNP simulations were 
performed to investigate the neutron and gamma flux behavior inside the dry cask. The 
results of these simulations aided the design of the RMS and determination of the 
optimal location for its components. The RMS was placed  inside the dry cask on the top 
of the multi-purpose canister (MPC).  The final conceptual design of the RMS included 
two fission chambers (to detect neutrons) and one ionization chamber (to detect gamma 
radiation) enclosed in a polyethylene box with a thin cadmium plate inside, so 
the sequence of layers starting from the MPC lid was: polyethylene bottom layer, 
cadmium plate, chambers enclosed in polyethylene and polyethylene layer on top. 
Such configuration provided a suppression effect for thermal neutron flux coming from 
the bottom SNF assemblies and made system more sensitive to the opening of the dry 
cask lid and removal of SNF assemblies from the peripheral MPC cells. The proposed 
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RMS design was tested through diversion analysis. The fission chamber unit design was 
successfully able to detect all the SNF diversion scenarios studied. The ionization 
chambers were able to detect only removal of SNF assemblies located just below it. 
However, the ionization chamber was found to be able to identify the opening of the dry 
cask lid through reduction in signal whenever the lid was opened. Therefore, 
the ionization chamber was kept in the RMS design to provide secondary confirmation 
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1.1.1 Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory and Storage Options 
The worldwide demand for electric power generation is constantly increasing. 
Thereby the popularity of clean and efficient sources of electricity generation, like 
nuclear power, is rising fast in both the developing and industrialized countries. 
Both consider nuclear power as a main component of their energy strategies that will 
allow to secure their future demands of electricity and to preserve their finite natural 
resources. It is clear that increasing the number of nuclear power plants (NPP) will 
inevitably lead to the increase of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) inventory, the management 
and disposal of which has always been politically difficult and a technically challenging 
issue. After the SNF is discharged from the reactor, it is placed in storage pools at 
the NPP site for cooling. These pools have limited capacity and usually are designed to 
accommodate about 10 to 20 years of discharged SNF from the core. Therefore, after 3-5 
years of cooling time, it is desirable to move the SNF to either a: (1) dry storage facility, 
(2) spent fuel reprocessing plant, or (3) geological repository [1]. Limited availability of 
SNF reprocessing plants and delay in construction of geological repositories led to 
the accumulation of SNF in both wet and dry storages. Also more and more countries 
accept “wait and see” policy, which means “first storing the fuel and deciding on 
disposal or reprocessing later” [2]. According to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), current SNF inventory approximately amounts to 290,000 tHM, 1/3 of 
which has been reprocessed. The IAEA forecast is 445,000 tHM by 2020, only 25% of 
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Dry storage facilities today are the most utilized SNF storage option. There are three 
types of these: (1) vaults, (2) silos and (3) casks. Vault is a large concrete building that 
has cavities for SNF, which is stored in sealed metal cylinders (Fig. 1, (a)). In a silo 
storage system, the fuel is stored in concrete cylinders, usually in vertical position 
(Fig. 1, (b)). Dry casks storage is a large number of metal-concrete casks placed on a flat 
concrete pad and usually located outside, near or away from the reactor (Fig. 1 (c)). 
Dry cask type storage has been widely used for the past 10 years. It gained popularity 
because of several convenient design features. It can be used for both storage and 
transportation. Its modular structure provides convenient flexibility if there are any 
changes in storing procedures with time, such as expansion, shrinkage or relocation of 
facility. Additional casks can be easily added to the existing facility as well as can be 
divided into several small sites if necessary [1] [2].  
Typical dry cask consists of inner metal canister (multi-purpose canister or MPC) and 
outer concrete canister. It uses air as a coolant and metal and concrete as radiation 
shielding. The MPC is sealed by filling the gaps inside with an inert gas to prevent 
corrosion of SNF and structural materials.  An MPC, depending on the dry cask design 
provided by different vendors, can store up to 40 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF 
assemblies. The MPC has metal grid inside that holds all fuel assemblies 
together (Fig. 2, (a)). After the SNF is loaded, metal canister is filled with inert gas and 
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welded. It is then placed inside the concrete canister and covered with a massive 
metal-concrete lid (Fig. 2, (b)). The space between the MPC and the outside concrete 






(a) (b)  
Fig. 2. Two main components of the dry cask: (a) inner metal liner with grid inside and (b) outer 




The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized dry cask 
storage option as “safe and environmentally acceptable for a period of 100 years” [1]. 
Different research projects are currently underway to prove this statement, but so far 
nuclear community has had mostly positive experience with this type of SNF dry cask 
storages [3]. Another significant advantage is the cost. Interim dry storage is 
significantly cheaper than the reprocessing or direct disposal. However, there are also 
some problems associated with SNF stored in dry cask: 
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(1) First is fairly high radiation level around casks. The definition of this radiation 
level may vary from country to country, because of different regulations and 
norms, and also from one cask design to another1; 
(2) Second problem is growing number of such storages, which will require 
additional efforts from operators and IAEA inspectors to provide security and 
reliable safeguards measures. 
 
1.1.2 Dry Cask Storage and IAEA’s Concerns 
The SNF should be subjected to the IAEA safeguards2 as it is irradiated “direct use 
material”3. In addition to unused uranium, SNF contains large amounts of fission 
products and actinides. The actinide of concern is plutonium, which when extracted from 
the SNF, can be used for manufacturing of a nuclear explosive device. Significant 
amounts of plutonium are expected to be contained in each dry cask. For example, 
a single dry cask with a capacity of 32 PWR SNF assemblies could potentially contain 
up to 20 “significant quantities” (SQ). A significant quantity is defined by the IAEA as 
“the approximate amount of the nuclear material for which possibility of manufacturing 
a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded” [4]. The SQ values currently in use are 
listed in Table 1. 
                                                          
1 For instance, at Comanche Peak NPP dry cask storage facility, dose rate at contact and middle 
cask height is 75 (mrem·h-1) and 1 (m) away is 36 (mrem·h-1) [35]. U.S. NRC limits for annual 
dose for normal operation beyond the controlled area of the independent storage of SNF is 
25 (mrem) [34]. Thus inspector who is working on the site and checking on seals will get annual 
dose within 1 hour of work. 
2 Objective of IAEA safeguards - the timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of 
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of 
other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by 
the risk of early detection [4]. 
3 Direct use material - nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive 
devices without transmutation or further enrichment. It includes plutonium containing less than 
80% Pu-238, high enriched uranium and U-233. Chemical compounds, mixtures of direct use 
materials (e.g. mixed oxide (MOX)), and plutonium in spent reactor fuel fall into this category. 
Unirradiated direct use material is direct use material which does not contain substantial 
amounts of fission products; it would require less time and effort to be converted to components 
of nuclear explosive devices than irradiated direct use material (e.g. plutonium in spent reactor 
fuel) that contains substantial amounts of fission products [4]. 
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Table 1. Significant quantities for different types of nuclear material 
Material SQ 
Direct use nuclear material:   
Plutonium containing less than 80% of Pu-238 8 kg 
Uranium-233 8 kg 
Highly enriched uranium (containing more than 20% of U-235) 25 kg of U-235 
Indirect used nuclear material:  
Uranium containing less than 20% of U-235  75 kg of U-235  
(or 10 t natural U, 
or 20 t depleted U) 




The IAEA’s goal is to be able to maintain the continuity of knowledge (CoK) about 
the nuclear material (NM) inside the dry casks, as well as be able to verify it, during 
the entire storage period. Unfortunately, dry cask design has some disadvantages that 
do not facilitate effective verification process: (1) fairly high radiation levels for 
inspectors and (2) inaccessibility of the SNF. Fuel, placed in the dry cask, is no longer 
accessible to be verified by simple counting or attribute tests4. However, there is also 
one advantage – no movement of nuclear material at the site - that simplifies 
the safeguards routine significantly. Once the dry cask is shipped to the storage, it is not 
supposed to leave its place until there is a decision to move it to the reprocessing plant or 
to the geological repository. It means there are not a lot of activities that should be 
monitored or verified by the IAEA inspectors. Also inaccessibility of the SNF implies its 
inherent security. 
Although the IAEA is currently putting dry cask storage facilities under safeguards, 
it is still lacking effective safeguards tools that can be used for verification of dry cask 
content. Based on the literature survey on the safeguards methods employed at the SNF 
                                                          
4 Attributes test - a statistical test of a characteristic (or attribute) of an item to which the 
response is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. For example, seal verification is an attributes test: the seal is 
inspected and the result should be either that it shows evidence of tampering or it does not. 
Verification of items by non-destructive assay for radiation emission is also an attributes test: a 
tested item either emits radiation within a specified range or it does not. A ‘no’ answer identifies 
a defect [4]. 
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dry cask storage facilities [5] [6] [7], it was found that current SNF safeguarding 
methods rely heavily upon containment/surveillance (C&S) measures with regular 
inspections to ensure that tamper indicating devices (seals) are still intact. The C&S 
measures include installation of seals and surveillance cameras. There are usually two 
seals placed inside and outside of the dry cask. There were several projects to develop 
and implement neutron/gamma radiation “fingerprinting method” [8] [9]. This method is 
supposed to be used for re-verification of the dry cask content and it is described in more 
details in section 1.2.  
The increasing number of dry cask storage facilities will increase the likelihood of 
C&S failure and loss of CoK, as all dry casks are usually stored outside and exposed to 
different weather conditions. One of the potential problems is that if the external seal is 
broken there is no other way to verify dry cask content but by opening the concrete 
canister and checking on the internal seal. This is a very undesirable and expensive 
undertaking. Hence, alternate methods need to be developed for safeguarding SNF 
in addition to those mentioned above. 
 
1.1.3 Why Remote Monitoring System for Dry Cask Storage? 
Remote Monitoring System (RMS) is important component of Information-Driven 
Safeguards (IDS)5 [10]. These are safeguards whose planning, conduct and evaluation 
are based on an ongoing analysis of all safeguards-relevant information available to 
the IAEA about a State. It helps optimizing IAEA’s efforts and reducing the number of 
on-site inspections to the extent feasible. For instance, under the integrated 
safeguards (IS)6, if “the IAEA has drawn a conclusion of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in the State” [4], then the inspection frequency for SNF 
verification may be reduced from the present 3 month to a 12 month interval [11]. 
                                                          
5 More information about IDS can be found on IAEA web-site: <www: iaea.org>. The IDS 
concept was extensively discussed during Symposium on International Safeguards in 2010.  
6 “Integrated Safeguards (IS) is a specific case of IDS whereby the IAEA has drawn and 
maintained a “broader conclusion” regarding the completeness and correctness of a State’s 
peaceful nuclear programme.” [11] 
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The forerunner of the RMS was Unattended Monitoring Systems (UMS). It is 
important to distinguish these two types of monitoring systems. The UMS collects 
safeguards relevant data through non-destructive assay (NDA) instruments and C&S 
tools (seals, cameras) and stores it on the computer server installed at the site. At the 
time of scheduled inspection, inspector may review recorded information to clarify, if 
any, inconsistencies or mistakes in operator’s reports and declarations. Today the use of 
unattended safeguards instruments is still a significant part of the IAEA safeguards. 
Surveillance cameras monitor relevant nuclear activities at the site; unattended NDA 
sensors are used to monitor reactor core refueling or any other flow of NM at various 
facilities.  The transmission of the safeguards data off-site via communication networks 
to the IAEA Headquarters or another IAEA location makes UMS a remote system, 
or RMS [12]. The principal of the RMS operation is shown on Fig. 3: as unattended 
system, it first collects safeguards data from the NDA instruments and C&S tools, 
temporarily store them on the local server and then transmit this data via satellite or 
phone link to the IAEA Headquarters or Field Office. The RMS saves time and 
resources for both the IAEA and an operator. Such systems allow automating some 
inspection activities and reducing the presence of the IAEA inspectors at the site. The 
system runs 24 hours per day, 365 days per year and continuously collects and transmits 
safeguards data. In other words, such systems transfer some of the routine inspection 
work to the IAEA Headquarters thereby saving inspector’s time on travelling, 
optimizing time and number of inspections and making a better use of the time when 
inspectors are in the field. The RMS also can enhance effectiveness of safeguards 
approach by providing real time indication of the anomalies and violations, which in 
turn, increases deterrence value of safeguards. For example, decision about inspection 
can be made if there is a suspicious change in the signal and inspectors will come to the 
site already prepared and ready to ask operator certain questions. 
The RMSs are especially useful at the facilities with high radiation levels and in 
places where the direct access to NM is very difficult. Dry cask storage falls into this 








To summarize, RMS could be a good safeguards tool for dry cask storage and, vice 
versa, dry cask storage facility is a good candidate for deployment of RMS because: 
(1) Dry cask storage is a static facility. There is no movement of SNF or 
manipulations with SNF at the site. The RMS, installed at the time of SNF 
loading, stays there and provides continuous information to inspectors; 
(2) Dry cask storage is an item facility7. It allows easy yes/no monitoring process. 
(3) Dry cask is high radiation level facility. It does not allow for extended presence 
of inspectors at the site; 
Dry cask storage is among the first facilities on the list for an extension of timeliness 
goal under Integrated Safeguards Approach: from 3 months to 12 months interval. 
                                                          
7
 Item facility - a facility where all nuclear material is kept in item form and the integrity of the 
item remains unaltered during its residence at the facility. In such cases, IAEA safeguards are 
based on item accountancy procedures (e.g. item counting and identification, non-destructive 
measurements of nuclear material and the verification of the continued integrity of the items). 
Examples of item facilities are most reactors and critical assemblies (critical facilities), and 
storage installations for reactor fuel [4]. 
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Deployment of RMS may extend timeliness goal even more and transform classic on-
site inspections to remote safeguards inspections [11]. 
 
1.2 Previous Work 
Researchers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) conducted 
studies to analyze the feasibility of the “fingerprinting method” [14]. The measurement 
campaign was performed at the Idaho National Laboratory at the Test Area North. 
They examined the radiation signals (both neutron and gamma) from six different types 
of SNF dry storage casks using thermal neutron and gamma-ray imaging systems. 
This type of NDA instruments uses the coded-aperture technique. To get a good quality 
image, the instrument requires certain installation procedures and a few hours 
measurements. The corrections to results should be made if wind changes the aperture 
position during the measurement. Also, it is important not to detect signal from 
the neighboring casks. The results of their research proved that the radiation pattern 
emitted by SNF inside the cask is dependent on the type of dry cask and can be used for 
producing images (“fingerprints”). However, certain complications were discovered 
with both gamma and thermal neutron signals: 
(1) Gamma radiation unscattered component, which originates directly from 
the nuclide decay and does not undergo scattering before it reaches the detector, 
caries information about its actual point of origin inside the cask and therefore is 
useful for imaging (fingerprinting) of cask content. This component was easily 
detectable by germanium spectrometer, but was not visible for gamma imager 
used in the experiment. Instead, the scattered component, which originates 
directly from the nuclide decay and does undergo scattering before reaches 
the detector, was dominant in the obtained gamma images. It washed out all 
the details, because due to scattering these gammas did not carry information 
about its point of origin anymore.  This observation led to a conclusion that 
a better gamma imager, sensitive to higher energies unscattered gammas and 
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with larger detector surface area, should be developed to produce images with 
sufficient details and within hour timescales.  
(2) Neutron radiation signal has also two components: scattered (thermal neutrons) 
and unscattered (fast neutrons). Similar to the case of gammas, unscattered (fast) 
neutrons carry information about their origin inside the cask, while thermal 
neutrons, due to multiple scattering in cask concrete walls, can only create fuzzy 
images with no details about dry cask content, like distinction between SNF 
assemblies.   During the experiment, it was proved that fast neutrons could leave 
the cask without scattering. But there is no currently existing fast 
neutron-imaging instrument; one is being developed by Brookhaven National 
Laboratory [14]. 
As a result of this study, LLNL researchers concluded that “further development and 
enhancement of non-destructive techniques and equipment are required in order to get 
better signal processing” and images (“fingerprints”) with sufficient details about dry 
cask content. There is also one more limitation of the fingerprinting method that was not 
considered in this study. As mentioned above, emitted radiation pattern depends on 
the dry cask design. But this relation can be lost. It was found that some states might 
apply additional shielding around the dry casks to comply with their local regulations. 
For example, Taiwan Power Company put additional 30 (cm) thick concrete at the top 
and 35 (cm) concrete around the side of each storage cask to the original design of 
Universal Multi-Purpose System provided by NAC International Inc. [13]. Such design 
modifications may significantly influence both gamma and neutron signals. 
Another challenge may arise if dry cask design uses boron-bearing materials that absorb 
neutrons and may block thermal neutron signal. It is also important to note the cost of 
such imaging system. In the LLNL study, gamma imager cost was estimated about 
$1,000,000. The system includes germanium detector that requires cooling with liquid 
nitrogen, electronics, shielding materials and different coded-apertures. 
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Assessment of the fingerprinting method for CANDU8 reactor SNF was conducted at 
the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute, Texas A&M University [15], which 
also determined that better re-verification methods are required to improve 
the non-detection probability. Another attempt was made on the development of 
a Compton Dry-Cask Imaging System by the Idaho National Laboratory [16], but 
publicly available information does not address the issue of various SNF diversion 
scenarios and does not elaborate on technical characteristics of the detection system. 
 From the survey of previous research work in this area, it can be concluded that there 
is not enough work performed on the investigation of neutron/gamma signals change for 
different SNF diversion scenarios, including opening of the dry cask and removal of 
SNF assemblies. There were also no references found about RMS option for dry cask 
storage facilities that could be designed and used for SNF safeguarding, which justified 
the reason for this thesis work. 
 
1.3 Objective and Motivations 
The objective of this thesis was to develop a conceptual design of a neutron and/or 
gamma based RMS that allows maintaining the CoK on SNF in dry cask storage and 
detection of possible diversion of SNF assemblies for various hypothetical diversion 
cases. 
The growing amount of SNF and the wide use of dry cask storage facilities was 
the first motivation for this thesis work. The second one was the verification challenge 
associated with this type of dry storage. 
This study used a computational approach. The thesis does not cover electronics and 
equipment required for the encryption and remote transmission of the signal from 




                                                          
8 CANDU states for CANada Deuterium Uranium reactor 
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1.4 Thesis Overview 
This thesis focused on the development of a neutron and/or gamma based RMS 
design and studied the feasibility of its deployment inside a PWR SNF dry cask. 
The goal of the study is to design such a system concept in a way that it would allow 
maintaining the CoK on the dry cask content and detecting the diversion under different 
scenarios.  
Section 2 of this thesis elaborates on the development of the dry cask computer model 
created using MCNP transport code, including evaluation of the radiation source-term 
for one PWR SNF assembly conducted with ORIGEN-ARP. This section also includes 
procedure and  results of the analytical calculations performed for MCNP dry cask 
model validation. 
Section 3 describes the development of the conceptual RMS design. It includes 
the series of tests (purpose and setup) that were created to investigate neutron and 
gamma flux behavior inside and outside the dry cask; and review of the other factors 
used for derivation of general design requirements. The section is concluded with choice 
of the RMS components and review of the preliminary RMS design. 
Section 4 presents the results of the diversion analysis with the preliminary RMS 
design, including calculation of non-detection probabilities for every diversion scenario. 
The diversion analysis outcome was used to arrive at the final design 
Section 5 consists of concluding discussions of the RMS data representation to 




2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRY CASK COMPUTER MODEL 
 
2.1 Procedure 
The first step of this study was creation of a computer model of the dry cask with 
SNF assemblies inside. This model was used for simulation of the realistic radiation 
environment and SNF radiation signatures required to choose RMS components and 
evaluate its performance. The following tasks were completed to create computer model 
of the dry cask: 
(1) Modeling of a generic dry cask with PWR SNF assemblies inside using the 
radiation transport code, MCNP; 
(2) Estimation of the gamma and  neutron  radiation  source terms for PWR reactor 
SNF assembly with typical initial enrichment and fuel burn-up; 
(3) Validation of the MCNP model through analytical calculations. 
 
2.2 MCNP Modeling 
Today, computer simulations present a cost- and time-efficient opportunity to 
investigate the behavior of complex systems, like the one used in this study. Also use of 
computer codes allow testing different system designs, estimate their performance in the 
virtual world first and only after that, using simulation results, create a successful 
prototype of the system for testing in the field. One of the computer codes widely used 
today is MCNP, developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. MCNP is a 
general-purpose Monte Carlo N-Particle code that can be used for neutron, photon, and 
electron or coupled neutron/photon/electron transport.  The code also allows 
development of complex three-dimensional combinatorial geometry [17]. MCNP was 
utilized to create a dry cask computer model. The dry cask model was developed in two 
steps: (1) model of PWR assembly was designed and (2) dry cask was created and filled 
with the same 32 PWR assemblies. The following sections provide more detailed 




2.2.1 MCNP Model of a PWR Fuel Assembly 
The PWR under study is one of the types of light water reactors (LWR) that uses light 
water as primary and secondary coolant and as neutron moderator. The PWR fuel is 
usually made out of low enriched uranium in the form of uranium dioxide (UO2). 
Uranium dioxide fuel pellets are placed inside Zircaloy tubes, which are then assembled 
together in 15×15 or 17×17 fuel rod arrays. There is no unified fuel assembly design for 
all types of PWR. The number of fuel rods, rods with burnable poison and control rods 
depends on reactor features and customer’s needs. This study used PWR fuel assembly, 
ACE7, developed by Korean Nuclear Fuel Company. The technical specifications of the 
ACE7 PWR fuel assembly used to develop MCNP model were collected from Nuclear 
Engineering International Magazine [18]. This fuel assembly design uses a 17×17 fuel 
rod array with 25 unfueled positions that are either filled with water or boron 
absorber rods. Overall assembly length is 406.3 (cm) of which 388.1 (cm) is active fuel 
length and the rest is structural support material such as top and bottom nozzles, springs, 
fission gas plenums and filters. Each fuel rod contains about 394 fuel pellets in 
a Zircaloy tube with a wall thickness of 0.0572 (cm). Fuel pellets are 0.983 (cm) long 
and 0.8192 (cm) in diameter. They are stacked inside the rod and the gaps between them 
and cladding material is filled with helium gas to improve the conduction of heat from 




Table 2. Dimensions of the ACE 7 fuel assembly 
Dimension Value, (cm) 
Pellet outside diameter 0.8192 
Pellet length 0.983 
Rod outside diameter 0.95 
Rod inner diameter 0.8356 
Clad thickness 0.0572 
Rod length 388.1 
Plenum length 9.1 
Overall assembly length 406.3 
Overall assembly width 21.4 
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For this study, the helium gap between fuel and cladding was not modeled. It was 
assumed that the fuel swelled after irradiation and the helium was displaced to the top 
and bottom of the fuel rod to the plenum region. Therefore the fuel density and materials 
composition were re-calculated to take into account those effects. To find a new density 
for the fuel after irradiation, the total fuel mass in one rod was divided by the rod volume 
that was occupied by the fresh fuel and helium gap together before irradiation. 
As a result the fuel density after swelling was found to be 9.97 (g·cm-3). For comparison, 
the density of the fresh uranium dioxide fuel is usually about 10.4 (g·cm-3). The plenum 
region after irradiation would contain displaced helium, Zircaloy and stainless steel. 
The volume fractions for these materials were estimated using information presented in 
[19] for the fuel region # 7. Those volume fractions were then multiplied by the volume 
of the plenum region and related densities to find materials weight fractions for usage in 
the MCNP input file. The final density of the homogenized mixture of helium, Zircaloy 
and stainless steel was found to be 2.46 (g·cm-3). Information about other materials used, 
their densities and compositions can be found in the MCNP input file in Appendix A or 
in “MCNP Material Primer” prepared by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory [20]. 
Also for simplicity, the structural assembly components, such as top and bottom nozzles, 
grid, etc., were not modeled. A picture of a typical PWR fuel assembly and drawing 














    Fuel  Plenum  Unfueled channels 
 
Fig. 4. Typical PWR fuel assembly (a)  and  its MCNP  model  used  in  this  study: (b) top view, 




2.2.2 MCNP Model of a Dry Cask 
The dimensions and characteristics of the MCNP dry cask model were roughly based 
upon the dry cask design HI-STORM 100S Version B developed by HOLTEC Inc 
[21] [22]. This design can accommodate the MPC with a capacity of 32 PWR fuel 
assemblies. The MPC is made of stainless steel, and it has an inner grid with 32 cells for 
storing individual SNF assemblies. Each cell has liners made of Boral for additional 
neutron shielding. The outer concrete canister has three main layers: thin inner and outer 
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shells made of carbon steel and a thick concrete layer in-between. The dimensions used 
for the MCNP model are presented in Table 3, and the drawing of the model is shown 
in Fig. 5. Information about the materials used, their densities and compositions can be 
found in the MCNP input file in Appendix A.  
As mentioned above, a dry cask storage site is usually a large number of casks placed 
on a flat concrete pad and located outside, near or away from the reactor. For this study, 
concrete pad and surrounding dry casks were not modeled; it was assumed that they do 




Table 3. Dimensions for the MCNP model of the dry cask 
Dimensions for the multi-purpose canister (MPC) Value, (cm) 
Outer steel radius 84.4 
Inner steel radius 83 
Steel lid thickness 24 
Grid thickness 0.72 
Boral liner thickness 0.25 
Cell dimension 23.03×23.03 
Dimension for the outer concrete canister Value, (cm) 
Radial layers:  
Outer radius 165.1 
Inner radius 91.9 
Inner carbon steel shell thickness 2.5 
Outer carbon steel shell thickness 0.7 
Concrete thickness 69.8 
Top layers:  
Concrete thickness 20 
Stainless steel ring thickness 8 
Stainless steel top thickness 2.5 
Bottom layers:  









 Fuel region  Concrete  Stainless steel 
 Carbon steel  Air    
 




2.3 Generation of the Radiation Source-Term for PWR Spent Fuel Assembly 
To generate the radiation source-term, ORIGEN-ARP burn-up code was used [23]. 
ORIGEN-ARP was developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. It allows simulating 
fuel irradiation and radioactive decay during cooling, and then creating output files 
in terms of nuclide concentration, radioactivities and their neutron/gamma 
emission rates. 
To produce radiation signature associated with SNF, it was necessary to simulate 
irradiation of fuel for 3 operational cycles as it stays in the reactor core. Typically each 
of those cycles lasts about 18-24 months. During this time, due to various nuclear 
reactions, fuel accumulates significant amount of fission products and actinides that 
absorbs neutrons. At this time fuel should be removed from the core and placed into 
a storage pool. After discharge, SNF becomes a source of high energy neutrons due to 
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spontaneous fission of actinides (e.g. Pu-240, Cm-244, Am-243) and (α, n) reactions on 
light elements; and of intense gamma radiation due to decay of fission products 
(e.g. Cs-137, Eu-154), and activation of the cladding material (e.g. Zr-95, Co-60). 
In the wet storage, SNF is usually cooled for 3-5 years before it can be moved into a dry 
storage facility. 
For the purpose of this study, it was assumed that all 32 SNF assemblies have 
the same (1) initial enrichment – 3.9%, (2) burn-up – 45,000 MWd/Mt, and (3) cooling 
time – 3 years. The gamma source strength was estimated using 18 energy groups and 
neutron source strength using 44 energy groups. The gamma and neutron energy groups 
and respective source strength are given in Appendix B. 
The gamma spectrum has the highest emission rate in the middle energy groups, 
low (0.001-0.03 (MeV)) and high energy (above 2 (MeV)) gammas provide less 
contribution to the total emission rate. As shown on graph in Fig. 6, gamma intensity 
peak is located around 0.6-0.7 (MeV). This is due to high and virtually constant 
concentration of fission products like Cs-137. Some other dominant gamma-emitting 





Fig. 6. Gamma spectrum for the PWR SNF assembly with discharge burn-up 45 GWd/Mt burned 





























Gamma energy, (MeV) 
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Table 4. Concentration, half-lives, and prominent gamma energy of fission product isotopes with 
the highest gamma emission rate per one PWR SNF assembly 








after discharge, (g) 
Concentration after 3 
years of cooling time, (g) 
Zr-95 0.17  724.2 43.1 7.49E+01 5.32E-04 
  756.7 54.6   
Cs-134 2.06 604.7 97.6 1.06E+02 3.86E+02 
  795.8 85.4   
Cs-137 30.17 661.6 85.1 8.45E+02 7.88E+02 




The neutron spectrum has two maximums in the region of high energies at about 
1 (MeV) and 4.8 (MeV) as shown on graph in Fig. 7. The first peak is due to 
spontaneous fission of actinides and other transuranic elements. As it can be seen from 
Table 5, Cm-244 has the highest spontaneous fission rate and dominates SNF neutron 
source-term over long period of time. After Cm-244 decays, plutonium isotopes, Pu-240 
and Pu-242, will provide stable neutron signal from SNF. The second peak around 
4.8 (MeV) is due to neutrons from (α, n) reactions with oxygen present in fuel. 
The average neutron energy from such reaction with O-18 is 4.2 (MeV) and 
with O-17 is 5.5 (MeV). 
Neutron and gamma source strengths for 1 SNF assembly were 4.23E+08 (n·s-1) 
and 2.04E+16 (γ·s-1) respectively. These values were multiplied by the number of fuel 
assemblies inside the dry cask. As a result, for 32 assemblies the total neutron source 
strength was 1.35E+10 (n·s-1), and the total gamma source strength 
was 6.54E+17 (γ·s-1). These source strength values were incorporated into the MCNP 
dry cask model for the radiation transport simulations described in the following 
sections. 
At this point, it is also important to mention plutonium content in a single PWR 
assembly; it is about 5.51 (kg). Thus, single dry cask with 32 PWR SNF assemblies 




Fig. 7. Neutron spectrum for the PWR SNF assembly with discharge burn-up 45 GWd/Mt 




Table 5. Concentration, half-lives and spontaneous fission rates before and after cooling time for 






Concentration after 3 
years of cooling time, 
(g) 
Spontaneous fission neutron 
emission rate after 3 years of 
cooling time, (n·s-1) 
U-235 7.00E+08 3.72E+03 3.72E+03 3.88E-02 
U-238 4.40E+09 4.58E+05 4.58E+05 6.24E+03 
Pu-238 8.77E+01 1.24E+02 1.24E+02 3.39E+05 
Pu-239 2.40E+05 2.86E+03 2.95E+03 4.40E+01 
Pu-241 1.43E+01 9.34E+02 8.08E+02 1.67E+00 
Pu-240 6.56E+03 1.18E+03 1.18E+03 1.23E+06 
Pu-242 3.73E+05 4.17E+02 4.17E+02 7.27E+05 




2.4 Analytical Calculations for the MCNP Model Validation 
Once the MCNP dry cask model was created and characterized with appropriate 
radiation source-term, it was validated with analytical calculations. Here validation 





























Neutron energy, (MeV) 
22 
 
calculations and also simulated with the MCNP dry cask model. Since this study did not 
include any field experiments, analytically calculated values were assumed to be 
accurate enough to represent real experiment results. In turn, the MCNP dry cask model 
was expected to be capable of replication of those results. For simplicity, calculations 
were done only for the single gamma energy of 600 (keV). This energy was chosen 
intentionally for two reasons: (1) to avoid interpolation for the linear attenuation 
coefficients, and (2) because this energy dominates in the radiation source-term as was 
shown before (see Fig. 5). The gamma source strength was chosen as 1E+06 (Ci) 
(or 3.70E+16 (γ·s-1)), which is comparable with the source strength for one 
SNF assembly. Linear attenuation coefficients for the dry cask shielding materials were 
calculated using “X-COM: Photon Cross Sections Database” developed by NIST [24], 
and they are presented in Table 6. Thicknesses of the shielding layers can be found 




Table 6. Linear attenuation coefficients and densities for the dry cask shielding materials for 
600 (keV) gamma energy 
Material type Material density, ρ, 
(g·cm-3) 
Linear attenuation coefficient for 600 (keV), μ , 
(cm-1)  
Stainless steel 7.92 6.10E-01 
Carbon steel 7.82 6.03E-01 
Concrete 2.55 2.07E-01 




The isotropic point source test was developed to validate the “geometry splitting” 
feature used in the MCNP dry cask model for the importance sampling variance 
reduction method. Geometry splitting with importance sampling is a variance reduction 
technique available in the MCNP code. The MCNP5 Manual (Volume I) provides 
a detailed description of this feature [25]. Briefly, the thick geometry layers are divided 
into multiple layers with thickness usually equal to 1 mean free path for the dominant 
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gamma energy. Every layer is assigned an importance, the further the layer from 
the source the higher the importance. So when particles get transported towards 
the direction of interest, their population increases to provide better statistical 
convergence and hence lower variance. An appropriate particle weighting scheme is 
used by the MCNP code for not altering the answer when importance sampling and 
population adjustments are made. The particles getting transported in other direction 
undergo Russian roulette (which is the reverse of the importance survival sampling) 
to avoid wasting of computational time.  
For this test, an isotropic point source was placed in the center of an empty dry cask 
(with no SNF assemblies inside). Flux estimation was performed outside of the dry cask 
on the top, bottom and lateral radial (side) positions as shown in Fig. 8. Distance from 
the dry cask outside wall to the detector was 30 (cm). For analytical calculations, 
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where 
ϕ - uncollided gamma flux, (γ·s-1·cm-2) 
S – isotropic point source strength, (γ·s-1) 
R – distance to the detector, (cm) 
t – shielding layers thickness, (cm) 
μ – total linear attenuation coefficient of shielding layers, (cm-1) 







Fig. 8. Detector positions for the isotropic point source test 
 
For MCNP simulation, a point detector (or F5 tally scoring)9 and cell flux estimator 
(or F4 tally)10 were used for uncollided gamma flux estimations. The F5 tally was used 
because this tally score provides output that gives results separately for two flux 
components: collided and uncollided. However, during the simulations, the use of 
F4 tally was found to be more accurate in comparison to F5 tally to estimate flux on 
the top of the dry cask as can be seen from the results shown below. To get 
the uncollided flux estimate using F4 tally, a small cell with radius of 1 (cm) and 
a transport cutoff energy of 599.99 (keV) were used.  
The results of this point source test are presented in Table 7. From Table 7, it can be 
noticed that the results for F5 tally from the MCNP simulations at the side and bottom 
detector positions agree very well with the analytical calculations. The small 
disagreement between results may be attributed to the differences in linear attenuation 
coefficients libraries used in MCNP in comparison to those used in the analytical 
calculations. The F5 tally results for top detector position significantly overestimated 
analytically calculated value11. This was explained by F5 tally nature and the way 
                                                          
9 F5 tally is the point detector next-event estimator. “It is the deterministic estimate (from the 
current event point) of a flux at a point in the space. Contributions to the point detector tally are 
made at source and collision events throughout the random walk.” [25] For more information 
about F5 tally see [25]. 
10 F4 tally is the track length estimate of a cell flux. It estimates flux by summing track length for 
all the particles and dividing it by the cell volume. For more information about F4 tally see [25]. 
11 Debug simulations showed that F5 tally could replicate analytically calculated value for the 
top detector position, but only if radial cask layers were removed. With addition of the radial 






it estimates probabilities for particles that may contribute to the uncollided flux. 



















Side 2.51E+03 2.59E+03 2.97 2.82E+03 12.08 
Bottom 1.66E+03 1.74E+03 4.21 2.16E+03 30.18 
Top8 4.25E+01 2.53E+02 83.24 5.39E+01 26.9 




Results for the F4 tally from MCNP simulations also agree reasonably well with 
the analytical calculations. The differences may be explained by the usage of cutoff 
energy card value of 599.99 (keV). MCNP does not allow use of source particles energy 
as cutoff energy for F4 tally. Thus, gammas that scattered on small angles and lost less 
than 1.11 (keV) of their energy could contribute to the total flux. The F4 tally 
measurement was also performed for all the detector positions to verify agreement 
between results.  The difference between results increases with decreasing shielding 
thickness and is found to be consistent. It is higher at the bottom, where total shielding is 
thinner than at the side and the top, thus more scattered gammas could reach 
the detector. 
Based on the isotropic point source test, it was concluded that geometry splitting 
along with the importance sampling methods used in the MCNP dry cask model worked 
well for the dry cask shielding layers to yield realistic results for the gamma flux 




3. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE REMOTE MONITORING SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Procedure 
Designing of the RMS was a complex process consisting of several distinct steps. 
The following tasks were completed to arrive to the preliminary RMS design: 
(1) Derivation of the design requirements through: 
- Reviewing of the IAEA requirements to the new safeguards systems; 
- Considering of the inherent dry cask limitations; 
- Investigating of the gamma and neutron flux behavior inside/outside the dry 
cask. 
(2) Development of the preliminary RMS design based on the information from 
step (1) including: 
- Investigation of the concept feasibility;  
- Development of the schematic system design; 
- Selection of the detectors and materials that can be used, and 
- Optimization of the RMS components dimensions. 
Based on the previous work overview in section 1.2, it was decided that RMS should 
be placed inside the dry cask. The LLNL study [14] showed that measurements outside 
the dry cask have certain disadvantages mainly due to heavy shielding of the radiation 
signal coming from the SNF. Also outside location will require additional system 
protection to avoid technical failures caused by different weather conditions. 
If the system placed inside the dry cask, then it will be protected from the environment 
and, what is more important, it will have potential to detect signal from all the SNF 







3.2 Derivation of Design Requirements 
3.2.1 Inherent Dry Cask Limitations and IAEA Requirements 
Dry cask dimensions put certain constraints on the system size.  In the dry cask model 
under study, the air gap between MPC and concrete lids is 18 (cm). Once the RMS is 
placed in this gap, it is supposed to stay there untouched and continuously provide 
information about SNF until further decision on undertaking reprocessing or final 
disposal to geological repository. Thus the system will stay inside the dry cask for 
about 20 years12. During this time, it will be exposed to a high neutron and gamma flux 
(see section 2.3 for example of gamma and neutron production rates). All these imply 
that system should be very robust to withstand the harsh environment and be able to 
uninterruptedly transmit signal to the IAEA about the information on SNF. 
In other words, RMS has to maintain CoK about the dry cask content with minimum 
number of technical failures.  
In addition to the technical constraints, IAEA requirements are stipulated by its 
limited budget and increasing number of nuclear facilities it needs to safeguard. 
Therefore, IAEA wants new safeguards systems to be [11]:  
(1) Highly reliable and robust to reduce number of technical failures and number of 
maintenance inspections; 
(2) Easy in operation to avoid, if possible, additional inspectors training; 
(3) Cost-effective, and  
(4) Remote to reduce number of on-site inspections. 
 
3.2.2 Investigation of the Neutron and Gamma Flux Behavior Outside and Inside 
the Dry Cask 
A set of tests was designed to investigate the neutron and gamma flux behavior inside 
and outside the dry cask in order to get information for choosing optimal RMS system 
location, type of detectors and their number. The series of tests included: (1) row test, 
(2) lattice test, and (3) open lid test. These tests used full MCNP model with radiation 
                                                          
12 According to U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission official web page, site-specific license for 
SNF storage is valid for 20 years [34]. 
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source-term described in section 2.3. For plausibility, the dry cask was surrounded with 
the volume of air. Depending on the test purpose, point detector (F5 tally) or averaged 
flux in a cell (F4 tally) was used. Tests were performed for both gammas and neutrons. 
They were focused on the investigation of flux behavior in certain locations inside 
the dry cask, where RMS could potentially be placed, and also outside the dry cask. 
There were two main options for the RMS system placement: (1) side air gap between 
the MPC and the concrete canister; (2) and inside the air gap between the MPC lid and 









3.2.2.1 Row Test 
The row test was designed to find the contribution of each assembly row to the total 
flux or, in other words, to find out how deep one can “see” into the SNF rows behind 
the detector if a detector is placed on the dry cask side. It is clear that not all neutrons 
and gammas born inside the SNF will reach the detector placed either inside or outside 
the dry cask. Large number of particles gets absorbed inside the SNF and structural 
materials. Grid inside MPC (see Fig. 1 (d)), that holds all assemblies together, is usually 
Side air gap 
Top air gap 
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made of stainless steel and provides additional gamma shielding. Every grid cell also has 
Boral liner that serves as an additional neutron shielding. Therefore, if one places 
detector on the side, it is likely that not all SNF assemblies would contribute to 
the observed signal, especially those stores in the far back rows. It is fair to assume, that 
assemblies located closer to the detector provide larger contribution to the signal than 
those located on the opposite side of the dry cask. The test included four MCNP 
simulations. For the first simulation, radiation source-term was described in 
all 32 assemblies, which means that particles get started with equal probability in 
the whole volume of SNF. For the next three simulations, radiation source-term was 
described as if start in the first row of assemblies only, then in second and third row. 
The source strength was respectively changed depending on the number of assemblies in 
each row. The geometry of the model was the same for all four simulations, thus the first 
row of assemblies shielded signal from the second row; and the first and the second rows 
shielded signal from the third row. Point detector (F5 tally) was placed outside the dry 
cask at its middle height point, 30 (cm) away. Important to note that the outside detector 
position was also chosen with the intention to verify conclusions made in previous 
research work discussed in section 1.2, and it is assumed that the magnitude of flux 
inside a dry cask at the same middle height position is proportional to the one outside 
used in this test. The schematic of the test is shown in Fig. 10. 
Results of the row test confirmed the assumption made about the peripheral assembly 
contributions: SNF assemblies from the first row dominate the signal estimated at 
the detector placed on the dry cask side. The row test results for the gamma flux are 
shown in Table 8. Obviously, gammas get heavily absorbed in the fuel due to their short 
mean free path in fuel and structural materials (about 2 (cm) for 600 (keV) gamma 
energy). Thus, the second row of assemblies contributes only 5% to the total flux and 
the signal from the third row is not virtually detectable (less than 1% contribution to 
the total measured flux). It was concluded that removal of assemblies from the second 








Table 8. Row test results for the gamma flux 






All 1.30E+05 0.034 100 0.033 
1 1.22E+05 0.011 93.48 0.036 
2 6.60E+03 0.044 5.05 0.056 
3 9.28E+02 0.107 0.71 0.113 




The row test results for the neutron flux are shown in Table 9. The neutrons behavior 
is different, because they have longer mean free path (about 13 (cm) in stainless steel 
and 50 (cm) in concrete for 2 (MeV) neutron energy). Results of the test showed that 
even third row of assemblies provided considerable contribution of 13% to the total flux. 
However, if only one assembly is removed from the third or second row, it is unlikely 
that detector in side position will see at least 10% change of the signal. As in gamma 
case, it is fair to assume that only removal of assemblies from the first row will be 
detectable with neutrons in side position and will provide detectable change in 
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Table 9. Row test results for the neutron flux 






All 1.11E+02 0.013 100 0.015 
1 4.94E+01 0.008 44.66 0.016 
2 2.99E+01 0.004 27.04 0.013 
3 1.49E+01 0.005 13.46 0.014 




3.2.2.2 Lattice Test 
Another location for the RMS is the top of the MPC and between the MPC and 
concrete lids. In order to evaluate this location, the lattice test was set up. Its purpose 
was to investigate flux distribution on the top of MPC lid, in its center and at the edges. 
For this test point detector (F5 tally) was placed in the middle of the air gap on the top 
and against a center of each SNF assembly. For easier evaluation of test outcome, 
the results are presented in form of flux maps. These maps were created based on 
gamma and neutron flux values: the higher the value the darker the color. The maps are 
shown in Fig. 11.  
The distribution of the gamma flux on the top of the MPC lid had expected behavior 
(Fig. 11 (a)). The minimum is in the center because large fraction of gammas gets 
absorbed in the fuel and mostly high energy gammas make through it. The maximum 
flux was observed above peripheral SNF assemblies. This phenomenon could be 
explained by MPC geometry. MPC has several empty cells on its edge (see Fig. 10) that 
are filled with air. Therefore, gammas easily leak to these cells from peripheral 
assemblies, and due to less attenuating materials on their way and collimation effect 
more gammas reach detectors on the edges. To further understand this behavior, it was 
also useful to look at the distribution of gamma energies on the top. After dividing 
the gamma energies in three main groups as it is shown in Table 10, it appeared that 
the number of high energy gammas reaching the MPC top is larger in the center. 
But on the edges, there are fewer amounts of high energy gammas because of 
the scattering. Also important to note, that high energy gammas constitute less than 1% 
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from the total flux. This explains the exposure rate behavior (Fig. 11 (b)). Even though 
high energy gammas should cause higher exposure rate than low energy, the number of 
high energy photons is significantly lower to cause higher exposure rate in the center of 







Gamma flux Gamma exposure rate  Neutron flux 
(a) (b)  (c) 




Table 10. Gamma energy distribution on the top of the MPC 
Energy, (MeV) Gamma flux, (γ·s-1·cm-2)* 
  Center  Edge 
Low (0 – 0.07) 7.56E+05 1.81E+06 
Middle (0.07 – 2.5) 2.38E+07 5.13E+07 
High (2.5 – 11) 1.03E+04 5.74E+02 
Total:  2.46E+07 5.31E+07 




Neutron intensity has completely opposite distribution than gamma (Fig. 11 (c)). 
As was already discussed, neutrons have larger mean free path, therefore they more 
easily pass through the fuel assemblies and MPC stainless steel lid causing flux 
maximum in the center of the MPC. Large mean free path also explains lower signal on 
    
      
      
      
 
 
    
  
    
      
      
      
 
 
    
  
    
      
      
      
 
 




the edges, because neutrons from peripheral assemblies leak into the concrete easier than 
gammas and do not contribute to the signal on the top. 
It is clear, that neutron and gamma flux measured on top against each assembly have 
two components: flux from assembly just below the detector and flux from adjacent 
assemblies. Thus removal of adjacent assemblies should supposedly change signal in 
the neighboring detector for both neutrons and gammas. Based on the lattice test results, 
if detectors are placed on the top of MPC, then gamma detector should be located at 
MPC edges and neutron detector in the center of the MPC lid. These positions 
correspond to the maximum flux values that were observed and should provide strong 
and reliable signal to the detectors. 
 
3.2.2.3 Open Lid Test 
The third test, named open lid test, was designed to evaluate both side and top 
detector positions with respect to the first action of any diversion scenario considered in 
this study – opening of the dry cask lid. Indeed, the first act that the adversary needs 
to do for diverting SNF assemblies from the dry cask is to open the concrete lid. 
A significant fraction of neutrons and gammas scatter off the concrete lid and contribute 
to the signal inside the detector kept below the concrete lid, thus lid removal should 
significantly affect the detector readings. It was expected that detectors would record 
significant drop in counts. Open lid test included two MCNP simulations with open and 
closed lid. Detector void cells (F4tally) were placed on the MPC top in the center and 
edge positions and one more detector was placed in the side gap at the cask middle 
height as shown in Fig. 12. Simulations were performed for the estimate of the neutron 
flux, gamma flux and gamma exposure rate. The results for the open lid test are shown 




Closed lid Open lid 
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Edge 5.11E+04 0.0169 1.56E+04 0.0293 69.47% 0.016 
Center 6.18E+04 0.0155 2.00E+04 0.0259 67.56% 0.015 

























Edge 5.11E+04 0.0169 1.56E+04 0.0293 69.47% 0.074 
Center 6.18E+04 0.0155 2.00E+04 0.0259 67.56% 0.111 




























Edge 1.30E+01 0.0797 3.01E+00 0.0631 76.82% 0.080 
Center 8.17E+00 0.1413 2.50E+00 0.0591 69.36% 0.143 




There are several observations that were made based on these results: 
(1) The side detector position is not sensitive to open lid case for both neutron and 
gamma signal. The difference in flux constitutes less than 2%; 
(2) The largest drop in gamma flux was observed in the edge detector position, which 
is consistent with the lattice test results; 
(3) Neutron flux has almost equal drop for both edge and center positions. The edge 
value is higher than the center value by 1.91%, which is within 1σ interval and 
can be referred to statistical fluctuations. However, observed maximum value of 
neutron flux was consistent with the lattice test and was in the MPC center for 
both closed and open lid cases. 
 
3.2.2.4 Contribution of (n, γ) Reactions to Total GammaFflux 
The tests described above looked at gamma flux produced by fission products as 
a result of their decay. There is one more mechanism that could contribute to the total 
gamma flux - radiative neutron capture (n, γ) by certain nuclides. To simulate this 
contribution, MCNP input file could be modified to have neutrons as starting particles 
and gammas, produced through (n, γ) reactions, as particles counted by detectors. 
For this study lattice test was repeated to evaluate (n, γ) contribution. Based on its results 
decision was made not to consider (n, γ) contribution for the following reasons: 
(1) Radiative capture gamma contribution is found to be less than 1% to the total 
flux (see Table 14); 
36 
 
(2) Most of these gammas are in high energy range - from 6 to 11 (MeV). They most 
likely will not be seen by detector. For instance, mean free path for 11 (MeV) 
gamma energy in air is 4000 (cm), in polyethylene – 50 (cm) and 16 (cm) in 
aluminum; 
(3) Those MCNP simulations require a significant amount of additional computer 




Table 14. Contribution of (n, γ) reactions to the total gamma flux based on the lattice test results 
Energy, 
(MeV) 
Total γ flux, 
(γ ·s-1·cm-2) 




Total γ flux, 
(γ·s-1·cm-2) 




 Center Edge 
Low 7.56E+05 1.75E+02 0.02% 1.81E+06 1.54E+02 0.01% 
Middle 2.38E+07 8.64E+03 0.04% 5.13E+07 7.92E+03 0.02% 
High 1.03E+04 3.03E+03 30% 5.74E+02 2.67E+03 100% 
Total 2.46E+07 1.19E+04 0.05% 5.31E+07 1.07E+04 0.02% 




3.2.3 Final List of Requirements to the Preliminary RMS Design 
The following requirements for the preliminary RMS design were derived from 
the previous analysis on  the: (1) neutron/gamma flux behavior outside/inside the dry 
cask, (2) inherent dry cask limitations and (3) current requirements of the IAEA. 
The location of the RMS inside the dry cask was determined based on the review of 
the previous researchers work (section 1.2) and confirmed by the row test results 
described in the previous section. Row and open lid tests showed that system should be 
placed on the top of the MPC, between metal and concrete lids, because this position 
could detect opening of the dry cask concrete lid and has potential to detect the removal 
of SNF assemblies from different MPC cells (central and peripheral). Lattice test results 
suggested that neutron detectors should be placed in the center and gamma detectors on 
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the edges of the MPC lid. However, it was also decided to evaluate center position for 
the ionization chamber too. 
To summarize, the following is the list of general requirements of the RMS design 
derived from the previous analysis and test results: 
(1) Location on the top of the MPC lid: 
- Neutron detectors in the center; 
- Gamma detectors in the center or at the edges; 
(2) Total height less than 18 (cm); 
(3) Robustness to withstand high radiation environment for years; 
(4) Low price. 
Keeping in mind these general design requirements, the following sections describe in 
more details the choice of detectors, their number and other materials used to improve 
system performance and sensitivity. 
 
3.3 Type and Number of Detectors 
The choice of detectors was based on the requirement to measure both: neutron flux 
in the presence of gammas and gamma flux in the presence of neutrons.  
There are different types of neutron detectors: plastic and liquid scintillators, 
gas filled detectors, lithium glass and fission chambers. Most of these detectors have 
high thermal neutron efficiency, but they are sensitive to the presence of a strong gamma 
field. The only exception is fission chambers.  Fission chamber consists of a sensitive 
U-235 layer plated on its walls and filling gas (air or noble gases). It has the lowest 
detection efficiency for thermal neutrons, but this drawback is compensated by its low 
sensitivity to gamma exposure (up to 106 (R·h-1)) and large number of neutrons available 
for counting [27].  To minimize technical failures, like gas leakage, fission chambers can 
operate with fill gas under normal pressure. Fission chambers also meet such 
requirements as low price (compared to some other neutron detectors, for example, 
He-3 tubes) and ease of operation.  
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With regard to gamma detectors, ionization chambers were decided to be the best 
option. Semiconductor and scintillation detectors can be damaged by neutrons. Some of 
the ionization chamber fill gases may be sensitive to neutrons, like Xe. Thus air is 
a better alternative. Ionization chambers filled with air under normal pressure provides 
high reliability against technical failures such as loss of pressure and gas leakage. 
Also ionization chambers are cheap and easy to operate. More detailed information 
about neutron and gamma detectors, their operation principles and applications can be 
found in [27]. 
Today fission and ionization chambers can be manufactured in a variety of sizes. 
The diameter can vary from 1 (cm) to 15 (cm), and length – from 5 (cm) to 40 (cm). 
Also manufactures can produce chambers with custom dimensions and technical 
parameters required for certain application [28] [29]. For the purpose of this study, 
following detectors were chosen as a reference because of their appropriate 
dimensions [28]: 
(1) LND, INC., 30783 Fission Counter; 
(2) LND, INC., 50346 High Pressure Gamma Ionization Chamber. 
This study did not include modeling of real detectors in MCNP, but instead void cells 
with realistic dimensions were used to represent them in the RMS model. 
Fission chamber cells have length equal to sensitive length of 20.32 (cm) and diameter 
5.08 (cm), and its neutron sensitivity is 1 count per 103 thermal neutrons. 
Ionization chamber cells have length of 32.1 (cm) and diameter 5.08 (cm). The rest of 
technical specification and drawings of these detectors can be found and downloaded 
from manufacturer official web page [28]. 
Required number of detectors was determined by taking into account 
the requirements of robustness, effectiveness and minimization of technical failures. 
As a result, the RMS included two fission chambers and two ionization chambers. 
Two fission chambers were taken to provide more comprehensive coverage of MPC lid 
and to minimize number of technical failures. Two ionization chambers were chosen to 
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test their performance in the center and edge positions for different diversion scenarios 
described in the following section. 
 
3.4 Detectors Mode of Operation and Output Signal 
Fission chamber under consideration operates in a pulse mode. In this mode 
a separate electrical pulse is generated for every event, or in other words, for every 
interaction in a fissile material plated on the detector wall. Each pulse has its rise and 
decay times determined by electronics. It means that after each registered event, 
the system is not able to record another event until the previous pulse decays. This is 
called dead time of the system, which causes some fraction of neutrons not being 
detected. Along with other reasons, this dead time reduces the efficiency of the fission 
chamber. Therefore every fission chamber has a thermal neutron sensitivity parameter 
that determines how many of the incoming neutrons will be detected. For the chosen 
fission chamber it equals to 1 count per 103 thermal neutrons.  
To distinguish between thermal, epithermal and fast neutrons in the current model, 
the incoming neutron flux was divided into energy groups according to the energy group 
structure presented in Table 15. This structure was determined based on natural 
cadmium13 total cross-section behavior given in Appendix G. Every energy group 
includes cross-section feature like peak for thermal neutrons and resonance region. 
For calculating fission chamber neutron response only two thermal groups were used, 
which are 0.00E-00 - 6.00E-08 (MeV) and 6.00E-08 - 3.00E-07 (MeV). The rest of 
the groups were mainly used for investigation of other materials effect described in 
the following section. Thermal flux obtained from the MCNP model in units 
of (n·s-1·cm-2) was multiplied by measurement time (s), sensitive area (cm2) and neutron 
sensitivity parameter (count·10- 3 neutrons) to get the number of counts produced by 
the fission chamber. To get thermal flux, detected in MCNP fission chamber cells, 
                                                          
13 Natural cadmium was chosen because it was planned to be used as additional material in RMS 
design; the reasoning for that is described in the following section. 
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F2 tally14 – average surface flux [25] – was used, as neutron interactions with sensitive 




Table 15. Neutrons energy group structure used for calculation of the fission chamber response 
Group number Energy Cross-section feature Energy group boundaries, (MeV) 
1 Thermal Before thermal peak 0.00E-00 - 6.00E-08 
2 Thermal Thermal peak 6.00E-08 - 3.00E-07 
3 Epithermal After thermal peak 3.00E-07 - 1.50E-05 
4 Epithermal Resonances 1.50E-05 - 1.60E-03 




Ionization chambers are rarely operated in pulse mode. Today ionization chambers 
are usually operated in current mode, which does not create separate electrical pulses for 
every event. Instead, it determines the mean intensity of gammas interacting with 
fill gas. It does not resolve incoming gammas by energy, it measures total exposure 
caused by gammas of different energies in fill gas volume. Gamma exposure for air is 
measured in units Roentgen per hour (R·h-1). To convert flux units (γ·s-1·cm-2) to (R·h-1) 
the response function for a range of gamma energies was calculated using the following 
formula [26]: 
 ( )      (
   ( )
 
)
   
,        (4) 
where 
R(E) – energy dependent response function, (R·cm2·γ-1) 
E – gamma energy, (MeV) 
(
   ( )
 
)
   
– mass energy absorption coefficient for air, (cm2·g-1) 
                                                          
14 F2 tally is the average particle scalar flux on a surface. It can be thought as the limiting case of 
the track length estimator (f4 tally) when the cell thickness is approaching zero. For more 
information on F2 tally see [25]. 
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C = 1.835·10-8 – constant for units conversion, (C·g·kg-1·MeV-1). This constant takes 
into account conversion from (g) to (kg) and from (C·kg-1) to (R). 
Then to get the total exposure rate, gamma flux for every energy bin is multiplied by 
related response function: 
    ∫    ( )   ( ),        (5) 
where 
X – exposure rate, (R·h-1) 
R(E) - energy dependent response function, (R·cm2·γ-1) 
ϕ(E) – energy dependent gamma flux, (γ·s-1·cm-2·MeV-1) 
a = 3600, conversion coefficient to convert seconds to hours, (s·h-1). 
The response function calculated for every gamma energy bin and accepted energy 
structure is presented in Table 16. These numbers were used in MCNP input deck 
DE and DF cards [25], that way the model output results were shown exposure rate units 
right away. Important to note that this energy structure is different from one that used in 
generated radiation source-term (see section 2.3). The energy structure used in radiation 
source-term determines starting energy of gammas, while energy structure in Table 16 




Table 16. Response function values for the different gamma energies in air 
Energy group boundaries, (MeV) Mass energy absorption coefficient 
in air, (
   ( )
 
)
   
 , (cm2·g-1) 
Response 
function, R(E), 
(R·cm2) Lower boundary Upper boundary 
0.00 0.01 4.74E+00 8.70E-10 
0.01 0.015 1.33E+00 3.67E-10 
0.015 0.02 5.39E-01 1.98E-10 
0.02 0.03 1.54E-01 8.46E-11 
0.03 0.04 6.83E-02 5.02E-11 
0.04 0.05 4.10E-02 3.76E-11 
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Table 16. Continued 
Energy group boundaries, (MeV) Mass energy absorption coefficient 
in air, (
   ( )
 
)
   
 , (cm2·g-1) 
Response 
function, R(E), 
(R·cm2) Lower boundary Upper boundary 
0.05 0.06 3.04E-02 3.35E-11 
0.06 0.08 2.41E-02 3.53E-11 
0.08 0.1 2.33E-02 4.27E-11 
0.1 0.15 2.50E-02 6.87E-11 
0.15 0.2 2.67E-02 9.81E-11 
0.2 0.3 2.87E-02 1.58E-10 
0.3 0.4 2.95E-02 2.16E-10 
0.4 0.5 2.97E-02 2.72E-10 
0.5 0.6 2.95E-02 3.25E-10 
0.6 0.8 2.88E-02 4.23E-10 
0.8 1 2.79E-02 5.12E-10 
1    1.25 2.67E-02 6.12E-10 
1.25 1.5 2.55E-02 7.01E-10 
1.5 2 2.35E-02 8.61E-10 
2  3 2.06E-02 1.13E-09 
3  4 1.87E-02 1.37E-09 
4  5 1.74E-02 1.60E-09 
5  6 1.65E-02 1.81E-09 
6  8 1.53E-02 2.24E-09 




3.5 Other Materials and Their Dimensions 
Essentially all neutrons born inside the SNF assemblies are fast because they emanate 
from spontaneous fission and (α, n) reactions. SNF itself and MPC structural materials 
do not provide sufficient moderation. If fission chambers are placed on top of the MPC 
lid without a moderating material, then 7.54E+03 (n·s-1·cm-2) thermal neutrons reach 
fission chambers, 2.21E+04 (n·s-1·cm-2) epithermal and 6.26E+04 (n·s-1·cm-2) fast. 
Therefore, in this case thermal neutrons fraction equals to ~8% from total incoming flux. 
To increase fraction of thermal neutrons and improve fission chamber detection 
efficiency, it is proposed to load it inside a polyethylene box, which can provide 
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moderation in order to slow down the fast and epithermal neutrons into thermal 
neutrons.  
Another material proposed for usage is natural cadmium. Cadmium is known as 
strong thermal neutron absorber due to its 1/v behavior at the low energies and large 
resonance at ~ 0.2 (eV) (see Appendix C). It was suggested to place thin cadmium plate 
in between the MPC lid and fission chambers and inside polyethylene block as shown in 
Fig. 12 (b). Such configuration was expected to perform as thermal neutron flux 
suppressor: first neutrons coming from the bottom get thermalized in the bottom 
polyethylene layer and then get absorbed by the cadmium plate.  It was assumed that this 
suppression effect would increase fission chambers sensitivity to the following cases: 
(1) To the open lid case, because it suppress thermal flux coming from the bottom 
SNF assemblies and makes system rely more on thermalization of neutrons in 
the surrounding materials, particularly in the concrete lid; 
(2) To the removal of SNF assemblies from periphery, because it suppresses thermal 
flux coming from the central SNF assemblies (located just below detectors) and 
makes system rely more on the neutron flux coming from the peripheral SNF 
assemblies. 
Initial width and length for the polyethylene box and cadmium plate was chosen 
based on lattice test results. Figure 11 in section 3.2.2.2 shows that maximum neutron 
flux was observed just above four central assemblies or four MPC cells. According to 
developed design requirements, fission chambers were placed on the top of MPC lid and 
above these cells; centered with respect to X axis and symmetrical with respect to Y axis 
as shown in Fig. 13 (a). Therefore, polyethylene box and cadmium plate initial 
dimensions were chosen in such a way that they cover those four cells with maximum 
neutron flux and can enclose fission chambers inside. This corresponds to 46 (cm) 
for both length and width (see Table 3). The box thickness was chosen to be 7.08 (cm) 
which corresponds to 1 (cm) polyethylene layer thickness above and below detectors as 








 Fission chamber  Polyethylene  Cadmium 
 
Fig. 13. Location of fission chambers (a) with respect to the MPC center and X, Y axis, and 




Dimensions for the polyethylene box and cadmium plate were optimized through 
the series of MCNP simulations. In order to decrease computational time, these 
simulations used simplified dry cask model, created using MCNP feature of Surface 
Source-Write (SSW) and Surface Source-Read (SSR) [25]. The SSW card allows 
writing a surface source file that can be used in subsequent set of simulations. If particle 
crosses the surface of interest, it will be recorded, particularly its energy, position on 
the surface of interest and its direction cosines at each instant of surface crossing. 
Further, instead of using the whole model, one can use just the surface source. In this 
particular case, surface source was written over the fuel top surface. Then this surface 
source term was used in the simplified dry cask model that is shown in Fig.14. The input 
file for this model is presented in Appendix D. The SSR card was used in the subsequent 
MCNP simulations to read in the previously written SSW file as a surface source. 
This model does not include annular dry cask layers and, all the particles leaving 











 Air  Concrete  Stainless steel 
 Fission chamber  Polyethylene   
 
Fig. 14. A simplified MCNP model of the dry cask used for simulations aiming to optimize 




An impact of variation of polyethylene box size was studied through three separate 
series of MCNP simulations. The initial dimensions 46×46×7.08 (cm) were taken as 
a reference point. In each series, two of the initial dimensions were kept constant and 
one varied in the following order according to Fig. 12 (b): (1) polyethylene thickness 
below detectors (bottom layer), (2) polyethylene thickness above detectors (top layer) 
and (3) box length. Thus influence of each dimension was considered independently 
from others. The results of these simulations are graphically shown in Fig. 15, Fig. 16 
and Fig. 17. Three neutron flux components (thermal, epithermal and fast) are plotted 
versus varying polyethylene thickness. Neutron flux values constitutes sum of fluxes 
observed in two fission chamber cells together. It is important to note that addition of 
polyethylene box with initial dimensions increased thermal neutron fraction up to ~50% 
from total incoming flux. 
In first simulation series only bottom polyethylene thickness was varied from 0.1 to 
7.5 (cm) with step 0.1 (cm) before 1 (cm) thickness and with step 0.5 (cm) after 1 (cm) 
thickness. It was found that increasing this dimension leads to increase of thermal flux 
and decrease of epithermal and fast flux components (Fig. 15). At thickness 
around 2.5 (cm) thermal flux reaches its maximum and starts to decrease, because less 
Fuel top surface 
46 
 
and less thermal neutrons make it through polyethylene and get absorbed inside it 
without reaching the detectors; while epithermal and fast fluxes continuously decrease 
providing contribution to thermal flux component. The fact that thermal component 
continues to decrease shows that neutrons, coming from SNF assemblies just below 
detectors, provide main contribution into fission chamber count rate; and contribution 
from neutrons coming back to the detectors from other directions (from the top after 









The next simulation series was focused on varying polyethylene thickness above 
the detectors.  The results, shown on graph in Fig. 16, demonstrate initial increase in 
thermal flux that eventually reaches the same value as in the previous test when top layer 
thickness became 1 (cm); after this point it continues to increase slightly until 2.5 (cm) 
thickness and finally remains virtually the same. This behavior can be explained by 
neutron reflection provided by this top layer of polyethylene: epithermal and fast 
neutrons, which came from the bottom and passed through detectors, now got 
thermalized in the top polyethylene layer and reflected back to the detectors. Further 






























the thicker the layer the lesser amount of neutrons can make it back to the detectors 
without getting absorbed. Also these results confirmed that thermal neutrons coming 
from the bottom provide main contribution to count rate, and large part of thermal 
neutrons observed in this simulation series is due to constant 1 (cm) bottom layer of 
polyethylene. This constant bottom layer thickness also explains behavior of epithermal 
and fast fluxes. It can be seen from the previous simulation (Fig.15) that 1 (cm) bottom 
thickness allows only ~ 2.0E+04 epithermal and fast neutrons reach the detectors. 
The same value was observed in this test (Fig. 16) and it stayed constant until 1.5 (cm) 
top layer thickness; after this point number of epithermal and fast neutrons starts to 
decrease very slowly. This phenomenon confirmed that some fraction of fast and 
epithermal neutrons that were observed in the detector cells came from the top, and 









The third simulation was performed with varying box length along X axis, keeping 
top and bottom polyethylene thickness constant and equal to initial dimension of 1 (cm). 
The box length varied from 30 to 46 (cm) with 4 (cm) step. The results are shown on 






























the detector count rate, because, as was shown before, system heavily relies upon 









Thus, it was concluded that polyethylene box with dimensions 46×46×7.08 (cm) does 
not reduce observable thermal flux and even provides additional moderation Also it was 
found that variation of polyethylene thickness below detectors affects thermal flux more 
than variation of this thickness above detectors. It was shown that thermal flux reaches 
its maximum with bottom layer thickness of 2.5 (cm) and with initial dimensions for top 
and side – 1 (cm) and 46 (cm) respectively. At this point it was not clear what bottom 
thickness should be chosen, the one that provides maximum thermalization or some 
value before it. The additional simulations were needed to determine this optimal bottom 
dimension. These simulations were decided to perform together with cadmium plate, but 
first cadmium plate thickness influence on thermal flux was studied.  
The next series of simulations were performed to find optimal thickness for cadmium 
plate. The initial dimensions for polyethylene box remained the same: 46×46×7.08 (cm). 
The cadmium plate was placed between detectors and bottom polyethylene as shown 






























of 0.025 (cm) until 0.1 (cm) thickness and with step of 0.1 (cm) after 0.1 (cm) thickness. 
The results of these simulations are shown in Fig. 18. It can be seen from the graph that 
0.05 (cm) of natural cadmium was enough to absorb all thermal neutrons coming from 
the bottom. After this point thermal component curve reaches plateau. This is due to 
thermal neutrons coming to detectors from the top and sides that cadmium cannot affect. 









As was mentioned above, after simulations with varying dimensions of polyethylene 
box, it was not clear what bottom thickness should be chosen, the one that provides 
maximum thermalization (2.5 (cm)) or some value before it (1 to 2 (cm)). The next set of 
four simulations with combination of polyethylene box and cadmium plate was 
performed to determine the optimal polyethylene bottom thickness. For this test optimal 
polyethylene box thickness was thickness that provides the largest drop in thermal flux 
with open dry cask lid. Simulations included polyethylene box with initial dimensions 
46×46×7.08 (cm) and cadmium plate with thickness 0.05 (cm). The varying parameter 
was bottom thickness that was changed from 1 (cm) to 2.5 (cm) with step of 0.5 (cm). 






























compared to calculate drop in thermal flux. Drop in thermal flux was calculated with 




Table 17. Results for simulations with combined geometry included cadmium plate and varying 
bottom polyethylene box thickness: closed and open lid cases 
Polyethylene bottom 
thickness, (cm) 
Thermal neutron flux with 
closed lid, (n·s-1·cm-2) 
Thermal neutron flux 
with open lid, (n·s-1·cm-2) 
Thermal flux 
drop, (%) 
1 3.24E+04 1.99E+04 38.51% 
1.5 3.04E+04 1.82E+04 40.06% 
2 2.60E+04 1.45E+04 44.44% 




It can be seen from Table 17, that combination of cadmium plate and 2.5 (cm) 
polyethylene bottom thickness provided the largest drop in thermal flux than other 
combinations of the same cadmium plate and considered polyethylene bottom 
thicknesses.  If one continues to increase this bottom thickness then ~90% drop in 
thermal flux can be achieved at 10 (cm). However, so much polyethylene in the design 
will make system bigger, and then it may not fit to the other dry cask models that have 
smaller gap between the MPC and concrete lids. Another disadvantage of thick 
polyethylene bottom layer is that with time it may significantly block the neutron signal 
and decrease system efficiency as neutron source will decay. Therefore ~50% drop in 
thermal flux, that can be achieved with 2.5 (cm) polyethylene bottom thickness, 
was accepted as optimal and balanced option. 
 
3.5.1 Review of the Preliminary RMS Design 
Based on all the previous analyses discussed (model tests, investigation of 
neutron/gamma flux behavior, simulations to choose optimal dimensions for 
polyethylene and cadmium) and carried out as part of this thesis study, the preliminary 
RMS design for SNF diversion test was made and it is shown in Fig. 19.  
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Figure 19 shows top and axial views to demonstrate the spatial position of RMS 
inside the dry cask.  Ionization chambers are placed on the top of MPC stainless steel lid. 
Number of ionization chambers was already discussed before, and more than one was 
chosen to test its performance in different positions. There are total of two ionization 
chambers placed symmetrically in the center and at the edge positions. Fission chambers 
unit is placed on the top of the MPC too. Figure 19 (e) shows magnified image of 
the unit itself. Fission and ionization chambers are shown on separate figures and were 
modeled in separate MCNP input files, because MCNP simulations should be performed 
separately for gammas and neutrons. 
The final dimensions of polyethylene box and cadmium plate are summarized in 
Table 18. It should be noted that proposed RMS design is easily fitted inside air gap 




Table 18. Optimal dimensions for the polyethylene box and cadmium plate 
Dimension Value, (cm) 
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4. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL DIVERSION ANALYSES 
 
4.1 Procedure 
The purpose of this section is to describe diversion analysis concept and important 
terminology from safeguards standpoint of view. The objective of the IAEA safeguards 
is “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from 
peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear 
explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk 
of early detection” [4].  Diversion of nuclear material means “the undeclared removal 
of declared nuclear material from a safeguards facility” [4]. There are two types 
of diversions: abrupt and protracted. Abrupt diversion is referred to removal of 1 SQ or 
more of nuclear material in a short time that is less than the material balance period15; 
protracted diversion means removal of the nuclear material step-by-step in very small 
amounts (less than 1 SQ) over one or a few material balance periods. For this study, 
abrupt diversion of nuclear material was considered.  The diversion pathway considered 
in this study included two steps: (1) opening of the dry cask lid and (2) removal of 
SNF assembly.  It is also possible to remove individual fuel pins, but it is easier to do 
when SNF is stored in large storage pools. This type of diversion has been already 
considered by researches and special instrument was developed to detect individual fuel 
pins removal [30].  
It was assumed that, if the adversary finds a way to remove SNF assemblies from 
the dry cask then he would substitute it with dummy assemblies. Otherwise, if adversary 
leaves empty cells, this diversion can possibly be detected by simple weighting of 
the dry cask. Therefore, each diversion scenario includes removal of SNF assembly from 
                                                          
15 Material balance period (MBP) — under an INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement, the 
term is used to refer to the time between two consecutive physical inventory takings (PITs) (see 
No. 6.41) as reflected in the State’s material balance report (see No. 12.7). Under an 
INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, the term is used to refer to what more accurately 
should be called the book balance period, since the beginning and the ending dates of the period 
are not necessarily linked to PITs [4].Depending on the type of NM and specific State’s 
regulations, MBP can be from 1 month to 1 year. 
54 
 
one of the MPC cells and substitution with dummy assembly, made out of stainless steel. 
This material was chosen, because it is easy to get and it does not fall under the IAEA 
safeguards; meanwhile, natural and depleted uranium export/import should be declared 
under INFCIRC/153 (article 34, (a), (b)) and INFCIRC/540 (article 2a(vi), (b), (c))16.  
Also INFCIRC/540 Article 2a (vi), (a) requires declarations about source material 
(i.e, depleted and natural uranium) “quantities, the chemical composition, the use or 
intended use whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in [State] 
(if more than 10 (t) of U or 20 (t) of Th)”.  
The diversion scenarios analyzed considered the removal of one or two SNF 
assemblies from different MPC cells in the center and peripheral positions. Due to 
the symmetry of the MPC cell locations, assemblies were removed only from the top 
right quadrant. The diversion scenarios, with two dummy assemblies, were symmetrical 
version of some scenarios with one missing assembly. Radiation source-term was 
corrected to number of SNF assemblies present inside the dry cask after the SNF 
diversion. The simulations were performed for both neutron and gamma radiation. 
Description of the diversion scenarios in terms of source strength and SQ is presented 










Amount of Pu contained in 
missing assemblies, (kg) 
[Significant quantity] 
Source strength corrected for 
missing assemblies 
Gamma, (γ·s-1) Neutron, (n·s-1) 
1-5 1 5.51 [0.68] 6.54E+17 1.35E+10 
6-8 2 11.02 [1.37] 6.33E+17 1.31E+10 




                                                          
16 Full text of these documents can be found on official IAEA web page: <iaea.org>. 
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The reference run, which is dry cask with all 32 assemblies inside, was created 
to compare the results from the diversion scenario simulations. MCNP outputs for 
fission and ionization chambers signals were converted into counts and exposure rate 
(R·h-1) respectively. Since radiation measurements with large number of counts typically 
have Poisson distributions, it has assumed that the errors for all results were normally 
distributed. Therefore all results from both reference and diversion runs were plotted in 
the form of Gaussians. The mean value for the Gaussian was obtained directly from 
the MCNP simulations; the total uncertainty included MCNP uncertainty and virtual 
measurement uncertainty and was calculated using the following formula: 
       √     
              
  ,        (3) 
where 
σtotal – total uncertainty, 
σmcnp – uncertainty from MCNP simulation, 
σmeasurement – virtual measurement uncertainty. 
The virtual measurement uncertainty for fission chamber is a square root from counts 
recorded over certain period of time, because counts statistically represent direct number 
of successful events, i.e fissions in U-235 sensitive layer, which is a random process and 
obey normal distribution by nature. The measurement uncertainty for ionization chamber 
cannot be calculated the same way, because its readings are in form of exposure rate, 
which represents gamma energy deposition in air and does not directly represent number 
of decays resulting in gamma emission. Generally, ionization chamber measurement 
uncertainty is taken about 5-10%. For this study virtual measurement uncertainty was 
assumed to be 5%, and the total uncertainty also included relative error from the MCNP 
output17.  
                                                          
17 It is important to note that here MCNP uncertainty (random error) refers “only to the precision 
of the Monte Carlo calculations itself and not to the accuracy of the result compared to the true 
physical value” [25]. This random error is dependent on the number of particles used in 
simulation, and if one has enough computational time, it can be decreased to zero. The precision 
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Once all measurement results for the reference and diversion runs were obtained and 
plotted as Gaussians, false alarm probability (α) was set up as threshold and 
non-detection probability (β) was calculated for all diversions. False alarm probability is 
a probability that safeguards system detects diversion when, in fact, it did not occur. 
It is usually set at 5% or even less to avoid large number of false alerts. Non-detection 
probability is a probability to not detect diversion, when, in fact, it did occur [4]. 
This probability ideally should be about 5%, thus the detection probability (1-β) is close 
to 95-100%. It is always advisable to keep false alarm probability as low as possible, 
because every alarm requires response. In particular case it will require inspection, while 
the RMS goal is to reduce inspector’s presence at the site to the time feasible. But then, 
minimization of the false alarm probability will increase non-detection probability as can 
be seen from the graph in Fig. 20 (a). On the other hand, increase of the false alarm 
probability will decrease non-detection probability. Therefore it is always important to 
find a balance between two of them.  
The situation may be changed if one changes a measurement time. Increasing of 
the measurement time will give more counts in the detector and will reduce uncertainty, 
thus Gaussians will narrow down as shown in Fig. 20 (b). Then false alarm probability 
may be reduced to about 1% without increasing non-detection probability. But it is 
important to remember that time of measurement is critical parameter for the remote 
safeguards system. It should not be too long to facilitate adversary task, but it is also 
should not be too small to allow acceptable false alarm and non-detection probabilities. 
For the following diversion analysis the worst case scenario will be considered where, 




                                                                                                                                                                           
predicted in all the calculations performed for the SNF diversion analysis were less than 5% (see 
Appendix E and F). The MCNP accuracy was not verified in this study, because it does not 
involve any experiments. However, based on the previous MCNP validations, it is found to 







Fig. 20. Concept of the non-detection and false alarm probability with different measurement 




4.2 Diversion Analysis with Neutron Radiation Signal 
The results for the diversion analysis using neutron radiation signal and fission 
chambers are shown in Fig. 21 and on graphs in Appendix E. Here for the easier 
evaluation of the outcome, Fig. 21 presents only diversion scenario maps and calculated 
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non-detection probabilities. Appendix E contains results in graphical form (Gaussians) 
and related numerical data (detector readings and uncertainty used for plotting of 
Gaussians). For simplicity of calculations, measurement time was 1 (s). The number of 
counts presented is a sum of counts in two fission chambers together. The false alarm 
probability (α) was 5%, which correlated to 9.83E+03 counts from the reference run. 
The threshold was plotted on every graph in Appendix E and was used to calculate 
non-detection probability (β).  
It can be seen from Fig.21, that all diversions with one SNF assembly removed were 
detected with non-detection probability less than 5%. Here it is important to note that 
the smallest β was observed not in the diversion scenario-3 (DS3), where assembly was 
removed just below detectors, but in the DS2 and DS1, where adjacent assemblies were 
missing. This is the effect of cadmium plate that suppresses thermal flux coming directly 
from the bottom and makes the system rely more on thermal flux coming from periphery 
assemblies. The cadmium plate effect was also verified by doing the same simulations 
but with polyethylene box only. This case yielded the non-detection probability about 
30% for DS1 and DS4 where the farthest assemblies were removed. However, with 
cadmium plate these probabilities decreased to less than 5%. 
The effect of cadmium plate was also observed in scenarios with removal of two SNF 
assemblies. The DS6 and DS8, where two assemblies were removed from the MPC 
periphery, were still confidently detected. At the same time, cadmium plate and 
polyethylene did not completely block neutron signal from SNF assemblies that are 
located just below the detector system. Even so cadmium plate cut thermal neutrons, 
epithermal neutrons can still come through, get attenuated in surrounding polyethylene 
box and contribute to count rate. Therefore the removal of SNF assemblies located just 









Diversion scenario #1 
 
Diversion scenario #6 
α = 5% 
β = 1.44% 
α = 5% 
β = 0.06% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #2 
 
Diversion scenario #7 
α = 5% 
β = 0.09% 
α = 5% 
β = 0% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #3 
 
Diversion scenario #8 
α = 5% 
β = 2.48% 
α = 5% 
β = 0% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #4 
 
Diversion scenario #0 
(Open lid case) 
α = 5% 
β = 4.28% 
α = 5% 
β = 0% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #5 
  
α = 5% 
β = 3.12% 
 
Fig. 21. Diversion analysis results for the fission chamber unit. The yellow cell indicates 
removed SNF assembly and substituted with dummy assembly made of stainless steel. The blue 




Open lid scenario was 100% detectable. Opening of the concrete lid causes 
a significant neutron leakage from the dry cask and significantly decreases the counts in 
detectors. This result justifies the chosen RMS location inside the dry cask. The results 
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also proved that the adversary could be caught at an early stage of diversion when dry 
cask lid is opened and before the removal of SNF assemblies. 
As the last part of the diversion analysis with neutron radiation signal, measurement 
time was increased to 30 (s) to test if false alarm probability can be reduced to 1% while 
keeping acceptable values for the non-detection probability. It was found that increasing 
of measurement time up to 30 (s) decreased non-detection probability to 0% for all 
considered diversion scenarios. It means that proposed design can ensure low false alarm 
probability which is very important for safeguards systems working in remote operation 
mode. The results for the 30 (s) measurements are also presented in Appendix E in 
the graphical form with related numerical data (detector readings and uncertainties). 
 
4.3 Diversion Analysis with Gammas Radiation Signal 
The results for the diversion analyses using gamma radiation signal and ionization 
chambers in different positions on top of the MPC are shown in Fig. 22 and Fig.23 and 
also on graphs in Appendix F. The threshold, false alarm probability (α) was 5%, which 
correlated to exposure rate 5.48 (R·h-1) and 9.07 (R·h-1) respectively for the center and 
edge positions. These values were used to calculate non-detection probability (β). 
The only diversion case that was detected with confidence in both center and edge 
positions is the open lid case. The rest of the diversion scenarios did not cause 
significant drop in the gamma flux.  
The ionization chamber located in the center position could not detect any diversions 
except for the open lid case. This outcome was partially caused by chamber location. 
It was placed above the edge of the metal grid between central MPC cells, so it did not 
look at any specific MPC cell. Due to short gamma mean free path in the fuel and 
structural materials this ionization chamber did not detect DS1, DS2, DS4, DS5, DS6 
and DS8 where assemblies were removed from the far rows. However, the smallest non-
detection probability was observed in DS1, DS4 and DS6 (Fig. 22), where assemblies 
were removed from the MPC periphery. This is consistent with gamma flux behavior 
observed in the lattice test: the maximum gamma flux was observed at the MPC 
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periphery, because gammas can easily escape through empty MPC cells and reach the 
detector. Thus, removal and substitution of peripheral assemblies causes less number of 
gammas escape through empty MPC cells and reach MPC top that leads to decrease in 





Diversion scenario #1 
 
Diversion scenario #6 
α = 5% 
β = 62.72% 
α = 5% 
β = 47.31% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #2 
 
Diversion scenario #7 
α = 5% 
β = 92.09% 
α = 5% 
β = 80.21% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #3 
 
Diversion scenario #8 
α = 5% 
β = 82.25% 
α = 5% 
β = 92.21% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #4 
 
Diversion scenario #0 
(Open lid case) 
α = 5% 
β = 45.64% 
α = 5% 
β = 0% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #5 
  
α = 5% 
β = 88.83% 
 
Fig. 22. Diversion analysis results for the ionization chamber in the center position. The yellow 
cell indicates removed SNF assembly and substituted with dummy assembly made of stainless 
steel. The green cell indicates location of the ionization chamber 
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Another observation that needs to be explained is the non-detection of DS3 and DS7, 
where SNF assemblies were removed from MPC cells just below the chamber. This 
phenomenon was explained by domination of high energy gamma in the center 
(see section 3.2.2.2) and its enhanced scattering off dummy assembly and also 
collimation effect that makes these scenarios hard to detect with gamma signal. 
The ionization chamber located in the edge position had slightly better results. 
Important to note that besides location, there was one more difference from the previous 
case. This ionization chamber was actually placed directly above two of the MPC cells 
as can be seen from Fig. 19 and also Fig. 23. This chamber detected significant drop in 
the exposure rate when assemblies were removed from the MPC cells that are below or 
adjacent to it, like in the DS1, DS4 and DS6 (Fig. 23). However, it did not detect DS2, 
DS5 and DS8, where assemblies were also adjacent. This outcome was explained by 
assemblies’ proximity to the edge of the MPC. In the DS1, DS4 and DS6 assemblies 
were next to the MPC edge and to the empty MPC cells; therefore their removal caused 
larger gamma flux leakage out of the geometry and eventually led to detection. 
On the contrary, in the DS2, DS5 and DS8 dummy assemblies were surrounded by other 
SNF assemblies, and this masked their substitution. Also dummy assemblies provided 
collimation of the gamma flux coming from the surrounded assemblies, which was an 
issue for the central ionization chamber too. The open lid scenario was detected with 
non-detection probability 0%. The DS3 and DS7 were not detected because removed 
assemblies were too far from the chamber. 
Diversion analysis results with gamma radiation signal imply that for monitoring of 
all 32 assemblies several ionization chambers should be used. At least four ionization 
chambers have to be placed along MPC circumference to detect removal of peripheral 
assemblies with confidence. 
A different measurement time was not considered for the ionization chambers, 
because they work in the current mode and provide continuous measurement of 
the exposure rate. As regard to the false alarm probability, if it will be reduced to 1%, 
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then both central and edge ionization chambers will still be able to detect the open lid 





Diversion scenario #1 
 
Diversion scenario #6 
α = 5% 
β = 0.83% 
α = 5% 
β = 0.02% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #2 
 
Diversion scenario #7 
α = 5% 
β = 97.82% 
α = 5% 
β = 99.38% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #3 
 
Diversion scenario #8 
α = 5% 
β = 97.54% 
α = 5% 
β = 96.42% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #4 
 
Diversion scenario #0 
(Open lid case) 
α = 5% 
β = 2.47% 
α = 5% 
β = 0% 
  
 
Diversion scenario #5 
  
α = 5% 
β = 97.80% 
 
Fig. 23. Diversion analysis results for the ionization chamber in the edge position. The yellow 
cell indicates removed SNF assembly and substituted with dummy assembly made of stainless 
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4.4 Final Design of the RMS 
Based on the results of diversion analyses, the preliminary design of RMS described 
in section 3.3.5 was slightly modified. The performance of the neutron detection unit 
(fission chamber with polyethylene box and cadmium plate) was satisfactory; therefore 
no changes to the initial design were needed. Gamma detection unit (ionization 
chambers) did not perform as expected. Diversion analysis showed that to achieve 
the same non-detection probability as with neutrons, one needs to place ionization 
chamber against each two adjacent SNF assemblies. This was not a desirable option as 
large number of ionization chambers will increase number of technical failures and 
complicate signal processing. Therefore, number of ionization chambers was reduced to 
one. In the interest of making RMS compact, this ionization chamber was left in 
the center position in between fission chambers as shown in Fig. 24.  
Thus the primary detection mechanism of the RMS will be based on neutron radiation 
signal and fission chambers, and only one central ionization chamber will be kept to 
provide secondary confirmation for the open lid scenario. The final RMS design drawing 
is shown in Fig. 24. 
The performance of the final design was tested only for the ionization chamber that 
was kept inside the polyethylene envelope. The test included two MCNP simulations 
with closed and open lid. The ionization chamber detected 55% drop in exposure rate 
and could detect the open lid scenario with non-detection probability β = 0%. 
The additional performance testing for the fission chamber unit was not required, 
because the ionization chamber made of aluminum with air inside will be transparent for 
the neutrons due to their large mean free path. However, the addition of the ionization 
chamber decreased the total amount of polyethylene in the system that may affect 
thermalization of neutrons coming from the top and side. But it is not a concern here, 
because, as was shown earlier in section 3.5, the polyethylene top thickness did not 
influence neutron flux behavior as much as bottom polyethylene layer did, and bottom 








 Fuel region  Concrete  Stainless steel 
 Carbon steel  Air   Fission chamber 
 Polyethylene  Cadmium  Ion chamber 
 




It can be argued that usage of both neutron and gamma detectors is redundant, but 
then this redundancy ensures system reliability. A probability of failure is certainly 
higher for the fission chamber. Therefore if only fission chambers were used and they 
failed, then inspectors will need to go for an inspection to make sure that CoK about 
the dry cask content was not interrupted and also to fix the system. However, if there is 
an ionization chamber, which has very low probability of failure and ability to detect 





5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF THE REMOTE MONITORING SYSTEM 
 
5.1 Representation of Data to Inspectors 
The important part of any detection system is to process and present the signal to 
decision makers, in particular case to the IAEA inspectors who will make a decision 
about requirement for an inspection. Once RMS is installed inside the dry cask, it will 
start measuring thermal neutron flux values and gamma exposure rate. It then can store 
and accumulate the measured data at the local server and then transmit it to the IAEA 
Headquarters in Vienna (see Fig.2, section 1.1.3). It is proposed that the readings from 
the fission and ionization chambers can be recorded in 30 (s) time intervals and be 
transmitted to the IAEA after an 8 hour period. Such small interval of 30 (s) was chosen 
because it is not long enough to open the dry cask lid and replace its content. 
These 30 (s) measurement results can be plotted against the predicted curve that will be 
calculated to reflect the expected detector readings taking into account neutron and 
gamma signal decay over time, loading SNF pattern and specific dry cask design. 
The predicted curve calculation can be based on depletion calculations using burn-up 
history for each assembly, and on MCNP model of the cask. It is expected that this curve 
should be different for every cask, because every cask has specific loading pattern with 
SNF assemblies of different initial enrichment, burn-up and cooling time. Then results 
can be presented to inspectors in the graphical form that shows RMS readings versus 
time and predicted curve. Further specially developed software could calculate the 
uncertainty and acceptable deviation from the predicted curve, and alarm in a case of 
anomaly or significant drop in neutron/gamma signal that could indicate opening of the 
dry cask lid or SNF diversion. 
For this study expected neutron and gamma signal decay over 30 years was calculated 
using ORIGEN-ARP [23]. The results are presented on graphs in Fig. 25  in the form of 
production rates related to the 32 SNF assemblies with typical parameters for the 
enrichment, burn-up and cooling time previously used for source-term calculations 
(see section 2.3). It is fair to assume that production rates of both neutrons and gammas 
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are proportional to the counts and the exposure rate that will be observed in the 
detectors. Therefore Fig. 25 also presents probable detector readings (number of 
particles that will reach the detector) and simulated predicted curve. This data did not 
come from any experiments. It was simulated just to demonstrate how signal from the 
RMS can be presented to the inspectors. As can be seen from Fig. 25, the beginning of 
the RMS operation should start at the time of SNF loading. At this time inspectors will 
have certain knowledge about dry cask source-term and will take the first RMS 
measurement. These two points will serve as reference starting points for a construction 
of the related predicted curve for the particular cask. 
The graphs on Fig. 25 also show contribution from particular isotopes that will 
dominate in the observed signal.  Neutron emission rate will be dominated by Cm-244. 
It has about 18 years half-life and very high spontaneous fission rate, which ensures 
strong neutron signal for RMS over a long period of time. Gamma emission rate will be 
dominated by Cs-137 because of its long half-life (about 30 years) and it will continue to 
contribute to the ionization chamber gamma signal over a long period of time. 
It can be also argued that proposed RMS can be used as re-verification instrument in 
a case of power outage or loss of communication. It can be assumed, that in the case of 
a power outage, system will be able to work for some time using emergency battery, but 
when the batteries are drained, the system will stop working. After power restoration, 
system will continue recording neutron/gamma signal and transmitting it to 
the inspectors. This signal can be compared against the predicted curve and previous 
readings to determine if it deviates more than expected within an accepted uncertainty. 
The same procedure is applicable for the case of communication loss. In both cases, 
evaluation of RMS readings should be coupled with evaluation of C&S data, like 
















5.2 RMS and Current Safeguards Approach to Dry Cask Storage 
The current safeguards approach for the dry cask storages was described in 
the introductory section. It was mentioned that usage of C&S measures as the core 




































































Start of the RMS operation 
Fuel loading to the dry cask 
Start of the RMS operation 
Fuel loading to the dry cask 
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application of proposed RMS should eliminate the usage of C&S; on the contrary all 
these measures should be working together to ensure that dry cask content is remaining 
as it was at the time of cask loading. For instance, failure of tamper indicating devices 
(seals) will not be of a big concern if RMS readings will follow predicted curve and no 
anomalies will be detected. In this case failure will more likely be caused by weather 
conditions. However, if RMS indicates anomaly with intact seals, then inspectors will 
need to undertake additional measurements to verify dry cask content, because 
corruption of seals is easier than corruption of neutron signal originating from SNF. 
 
5.3 RMS Lifetime 
One of the critical characteristics for the proposed RMS is its lifetime in high 
radiation environment. The RMS lifetime will be mainly dependent on the fission 
chambers and electronics durability under the constant neutron and gamma exposure.  
There is one main component of the fission chamber that can degrade with time - 
fissile material layer (U-235). The degradation of this layer will be simply caused by 
thermal neutron interactions leading to fission events and thus decreasing uranium atoms 
density. This in turn will cause loss of fission chamber sensitivity. It was estimated that 
with constant thermal neutron flux equal to 6.18E+04 (n·s-1·cm-2) (see Table 11, center 
location) and sensitive material amount of 243 (mg) per one fission chamber [28], 
the expected fission rate in chamber walls will be 2.02E+04 (fissions·s-1) that will lead to 
decrease of uranium atoms density by less than 1% over 25 years. Thus burning-out of 
the fission chamber should not be the main problem in the RMS lifecycle. 
The other point of concern is the electronics required for the RMS signal processing, 
like pre-amplifier. It most likely will fail first because of constant radiation exposure. 
Therefore it is probably worthwhile to place pre-amplifier outside the dry cask. 
Other RMS materials, like polyethylene, will also degrade with time. The irradiation 
of polyethylene, in the presence of oxygen and at high dose rates, makes it brittle due to 
oxidative degradation and polymer cross-linking [31]. To prevent polyethylene envelope 
from a breakdown, the whole RMS unit can be placed inside a metal case with required 
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openings for the detectors and cables. However, continual irradiation may also cause 
build-up of hydrogen radicals (hydrogen gas) that need to be released out of the RMS 
case to prevent risk of explosion. The hydrogen build-up rate will depend on dose rate 
and polyethylene composition [32] [33]. The realistic polyethylene performance should 
be determined during the future RMS testing, and if hydrogen build-up will be indicated 
as an issue, then the RMS design should provide a mechanism for the pressure relief 
from the RMS case. 
 
5.4 RMS Cost 
It was mentioned several times before that due to increasing number of nuclear 
facilities, the IAEA needs to optimize number of inspections and make use of 
cost-efficient safeguards systems. Therefore cost of the proposed RMS design is 
an important factor for consideration. Table 20 below summarizes costs for all RMS 
components considered in this study. The total price constitutes $13,935. It does not 
include cost for the electronics and cables that will probably add a couple of thousand 
dollars more, which is negligible addition to the dry cask average cost about $1,000,000. 
Also this price does not include fabrication, installation and maintenance costs. In the 
future, if RMS will become an integral part of the dry cask designs, installation cost can 
be reduced significantly. At the current moment, RMS should be installed after SNF is 
loaded and sealed inside the MPC. It will require additional measures from the operator 
that needs to be negotiated with the IAEA inspectors. 
Also important to remember, that this estimated price is for one RMS unit, i.e. per 
one dry cask. Thus RMS installation at the dry cask storage facility with 50 casks will 
cost about $700,000. This price become comparable with the cost of the imaging system, 
described in section 1.2, the cost of which is about $1,000,000. However, proposed RMS 
design provides remote monitoring option, high reliability and high detection probability 
of diversion with potential to decrease false alarm probability to 1%. Therefore RMS 




Table 20. Cost estimation of the RMS components  
RMS component Cost, ($) 
*Cadmium plate, (46×46×0.05) cm 1,135 
*Polyethylene box, (46×46×7.08) cm 300 
**Fission chamber (2 pieces) 12,000 
***Ionization chamber (1 piece) 500 
Total: 13,935 
*The prices for cadmium and polyethylene were estimated using Goodfellowusa.com 
** The price for fission chamber was obtained from the manufacturer  








6. FUTURE WORK 
 
There are no doubts that additional experiments needed to evaluate other RMS 
parameters before it can be used. The most important question for the future 
consideration is the RMS lifecycle and degradation of the RMS components and 
supplemental materials under the constant radiation exposure. Another important field of 
study is the required electronics for the RMS operation and remote signal transmission. 
The other future work may also include: 
(1) MCNP simulations with different dry cask designs; 
(2) MNCP simulations with different SNF loading patterns that may include 
different burn-up and cooling time; 
(3) Building the actual device and testing it inside a real dry cask; 





7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The diversion of SNF is one of the pathways in acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability. There are few places where it can be obtained: nuclear reactor core, SNF wet 
storage, SNF dry storage and during SNF transportation. Diversion of SNF from reactor 
core and storage pool is a complicated task due to SNF radioactivity and sophisticated 
safeguards tools that are available to inspectors. However, once SNF is removed to dry 
storage, there is no more non-intrusive option to verify individual SNF assembly 
attributes. Moreover there is lack of efficient safeguards tools for re-verification of 
the dry cask content. The on-going research on development of re verification tools that 
can be used during inspections showed that radiation signal observed from dry cask is 
dominated by peripheral assemblies, and further research is needed to develop detectors 
that are able to see the inside of the dry cask. From other considerations, the IAEA has 
limited budget and wants to reduce on-site inspection activities wherever it is possible 
and replace them with remote monitoring systems [11]. Thus this study focused on the 
development of remote monitoring system (RMS) that is able to detect neutron and 
gamma signal coming from SNF inside the dry cask, detect diversions of both central 
and peripheral SNF, be cheap and robust. 
A number of tests, simulations and analyses were performed to investigate neutron 
and gamma flux behavior inside the dry cask. Also diversion analyses were conducted to 
arrive at the final RMS design. It was concluded that RMS should rely on neutron signal 
with respect to the SNF removal detection and use neutron and gamma signal for 
detection of the open lid scenario. The final RMS design includes: 
(1) For neutron detection:  two fission chambers placed on top of the MPC lid and 
enveloped in the polyethylene box with a thin cadmium plate separating 
the detectors and polyethylene bottom layer. More than one fission chamber was 
used to decrease the number of technical failures that could happen and also to 
provide more comprehensive MPC lid coverage. The polyethylene provides 
additional moderation to increase the fraction of thermal neutrons. The cadmium 
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plate improves fission chamber sensitivity to opening of dry cask lid, but what is 
more important to removal of peripheral SNF assemblies. 
(2) For gamma detection: one ionization chamber was placed on top of the MPC lid 
inside the same polyethylene box as fission chambers and in between those fission 
chambers. Since ionization chamber was able to see only the removal of SNF 
located just below it, it was decided that gamma signal will be used for detection 
of the open lid only and thus will provide secondary confirmation. 
The proposed RMS design was able to detect diversions of one and two SNF 
assemblies using neutron signal and lid opening through neutron and gamma signal. 
Non-detection probability for all diversion scenarios using neutron signal was less 
than 5% (with false alarm probability – 5%). Non-detection probability for the open lid 
case using both neutron and gamma signal constitutes 0%. It was also shown that false 
alarm probability can be reduced to 1% with increase of measurement time up to 30 (s), 
which will yield non-detection probability 0% for all considered diversion scenarios 
using neutron signal for the open lid case and removal of the assemblies, and using 
gamma signal for the open lid case. 
The proposed RMS design is the compact and cost-effective option. The RMS size 
and module structure should facilitate its installation process inside the dry cask with 
minimal annoyance of the operator. The choice of the detectors and simple operation 
principal ensures system robustness and easy signal processing. The system provides 
opportunity for the remote monitoring of the dry cask storage facilities, meeting all the 
established IAEA requirements. In the future RMS should be integrated in the future dry 
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MCNP INPUT FILE FOR THE DRY CASK MODEL 
 
Dry Cask Model with Capacity of 32 PWR SNF Assemblies 
 
c     -- Cell Cards -- 
c     -Fuel rods- 
101    1  -9.975    -102 -106 +105        u=1 imp:p=1    
102    3  -2.46      -102 +106                u=1 imp:p=1    
103    3  -2.46      -102 -105                 u=1 imp:p=1    
104    2  -6.53     +102 -103                 u=1 imp:p=1    
105    4  -1.205e-3  +103                     u=1 imp:p=1    
c 
c     -Air (water) holes- 
201    2  -6.53         +102  -103             u=2 imp:p=1    
202    4  -1.205e-3   -102                      u=2 imp:p=1    
203    4  -1.205e-3  +103                      u=2 imp:p=1    
c 
c     -Lattice cell #1- 
301    0             -301 +302 -303 +304  lat=1  u=3 fill=0:18 0:18 0:0 
      2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
      2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2          imp:p=1 
c 
c     -Assembly with boral on top- 
401    0                    -401 +491 -402 +492  fill=3 u=4 imp:p=1    
402    4  -1.205e-3  +406 -403 -492 +405  
                                #406 #407 #408 #409           u=4 imp:p=1     
403    4  -1.205e-3  +401 -403 +492 -402             u=4 imp:p=1    
404    4  -1.205e-3  +402 -404 +405 -403             u=4 imp:p=1    
405    4  -1.205e-3  +405 -491 +492 -402             u=4 imp:p=1    
406    6  -1.7           +406 -701 +777 -704             u=4 imp:p=1    
407    5  -7.92      +701 -702 +777 -704         u=4 imp:p=1    
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408    5  -7.92      +703 -777 +406 -702         u=4 imp:p=1    
409    5  -7.92      +704 -744 +406 -702         u=4 imp:p=1    
410    5  -7.92     (+403:-406:+404:-405)       u=4 imp:p=1    
c 
c     -Assembly with boral on left- 
501    0                    -401 +491 -402 +492  fill=3  u=5 imp:p=1    
502    4  -1.205e-3  +406 -403 -492 +405             u=5 imp:p=1    
503    4  -1.205e-3  +401 -403 +492 -402 
                                #506 #507 #508 #509           u=5 imp:p=1    
504    4  -1.205e-3  +402 -404 +405 -403             u=5 imp:p=1    
505    4  -1.205e-3  +405 -491 +492 -402             u=5 imp:p=1    
506    6  -1.7           +705 -403 +733 -708             u=5 imp:p=1    
507    5  -7.92         +706 -705 +733 -708             u=5 imp:p=1    
508    5  -7.92         +707 -733 +706 -403             u=5 imp:p=1    
509    5  -7.92         +708 -788 +706 -403             u=5 imp:p=1    
510    5  -7.92       (+403:-406:+404:-405)            u=5 imp:p=1    
c 
c     -Assembly with boral on top and left- 
601    0                    -401 +491 -402 +492  fill=3 u=6 imp:p=1   
602    4  -1.205e-3  +406 -403 -492 +405 
                                #610 #611 #612 #613           u=6 imp:p=1    
603    4  -1.205e-3  +401 -403 +492 -402 
                               #606 #607 #608 #609            u=6 imp:p=1    
604    4  -1.205e-3  +402 -404 +405 -403            u=6 imp:p=1    
605    4  -1.205e-3  +405 -491 +492 -402            u=6 imp:p=1    
606    6  -1.7           +705 -403 +733 -708            u=6 imp:p=1    
607    5  -7.92         +706 -705 +733 -708            u=6 imp:p=1    
608    5  -7.92         +707 -733 +706 -403            u=6 imp:p=1    
609    5  -7.92         +708 -788 +706 -403            u=6 imp:p=1    
610    6  -1.7           +406 -701 +777 -704            u=6 imp:p=1    
611    5  -7.92         +701 -702 +777 -704            u=6 imp:p=1    
612    5  -7.92         +703 -777 +406 -702            u=6 imp:p=1    
613    5  -7.92         +704 -744 +406 -702            u=6 imp:p=1    
614    5  -7.92        (+403:-406:+404:-405)          u=6 imp:p=1   l 
c 
c     -Assembly with no boral- 
701    0                    -401 +491 -402 +492  fill=3 u=7 imp:p=1    
702    4  -1.205e-3  +406 -403 -492 +405            u=7 imp:p=1    
703    4  -1.205e-3  +401 -403 +492 -402            u=7 imp:p=1    
704    4  -1.205e-3  +402 -404 +405 -403            u=7 imp:p=1    
705    4  -1.205e-3  +405 -491 +492 -402            u=7 imp:p=1    
706    5  -7.92        (+403:-406:+404:-405)          u=7 imp:p=1    
c 
c     -Air for cask lattice #2- 
801    4  -1.205e-3  -501                                       u=8 imp:p=1    










c     -Cask lattice #2- 
901    0             -408 +410 -409 +411  lat=1  u=9 fill=0:7 0:7 0:0 
       8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
       8 8 5 5 5 7 8 8 
       8 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 
       8 6 6 6 6 6 4 8 
       8 6 6 6 6 6 4 8 
       8 6 6 6 6 6 4 8 
       8 8 6 6 6 6 8 8 
       8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8                                                  imp:p=1 
902    0                      -601 +104  -107 fill=9          imp:p=1        
903    5  -7.92          +601 -602  +621 -623            imp:p=1        
904    4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +629  -623             imp:p=1        
9041   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +623  -6231          imp:p=2 
9042   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6231 -6232         imp:p=4 
9043   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6232 -6233         imp:p=8 
9044   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6233 -6234         imp:p=16 
9045   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6234 -6235         imp:p=32 
9046   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6235 -6236         imp:p=64 
9047   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6236 -6237         imp:p=128 
9048   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6237 -6238         imp:p=256 
9049   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6238 -6239         imp:p=512 
9030   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6239 -6240         imp:p=1024 
9031   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6240 -6241         imp:p=2048 
9032   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6241 -6242         imp:p=4096 
9033   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6242 -6243         imp:p=8192 
9034   4  -1.205e-3  +602 -603 +6243 -624           imp:p=16384 
905    7  -7.82      +603 -604 +629  -623             imp:p=1        
9051   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +624  -626            imp:p=16384 
9052   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +623  -6231          imp:p=2 
9053   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6231 -6232         imp:p=4 
9054   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6232 -6233         imp:p=8 
9055   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6233 -6234         imp:p=16 
9056   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6234 -6235         imp:p=32 
9057   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6235 -6236         imp:p=64 
9058   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6236 -6237         imp:p=128 
9059   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6237 -6238         imp:p=256 
9060   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6238 -6239         imp:p=512 
9061   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6239 -6240         imp:p=1024 
9062   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6240 -6241         imp:p=2048 
9063   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6241 -6242         imp:p=4096 
9064   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6242 -6243         imp:p=8192 
9065   7  -7.82      +603 -604 +6243 -624           imp:p=16384 
906    8  -2.55       +604 -605 +629  -623             imp:p=1        
9066   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +624  -626             imp:p=16384 
9067   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +623  -6231           imp:p=2 
9068   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6231 -6232          imp:p=4 
9069   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6232 -6233          imp:p=8 
9070   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6233 -6234          imp:p=16 
9071   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6234 -6235          imp:p=32 
9072   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6235 -6236          imp:p=64 
9073   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6236 -6237          imp:p=128 
9074   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6237 -6238          imp:p=256 
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9075   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6238 -6239            imp:p=512 
9076   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6239 -6240            imp:p=1024 
9077   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6240 -6241            imp:p=2048 
9078   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6241 -6242            imp:p=4096 
9079   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6242 -6243            imp:p=8192 
9080   8  -2.55      +604 -605 +6243 -624              imp:p=16384 
907    7  -7.82       +605 -606  +622 -626               imp:p=1        
908    5  -7.92         -602 -621 +629                  imp:p=1        
909    4  -1.205e-3  -601 -104 +621                  imp:p=1        
910    5  -7.92         -605 -629 +622                  imp:p=1        
924    4  -1.205e-3  -601 -623  +107                 imp:p=1        
925    5  -7.92       -602 -6231 +623                 imp:p=2        
9251   5  -7.92      -602 +6231 -6232               imp:p=4 
9252   5  -7.92      -602 +6232 -6233               imp:p=8 
9253   5  -7.92      -602 +6233 -6234               imp:p=16 
9254   5  -7.92      -602 +6234 -6235               imp:p=32 
9255   5  -7.92      -602 +6235 -6236               imp:p=64 
9256   5  -7.92      -602 +6236 -6237               imp:p=128 
9257   5  -7.92      -602 +6237 -6238               imp:p=256 
9258   5  -7.92      -602 +6238 -6239               imp:p=512 
9259   5  -7.92      -602 +6239 -6240               imp:p=1024 
9260   5  -7.92      -602 +6240 -6241               imp:p=2048 
9261   5  -7.92      -602 +6241 -6242               imp:p=4096 
9262   5  -7.92      -602 +6242 -6243               imp:p=8192 
9263   5  -7.92      -602 +6243 -624                 imp:p=16384 
926    4  -1.205e-3  -603 -625  +624                imp:p=16384    
927    5  -7.92         -606 +603  -625 +626       imp:p=16384    
929    8  -2.55         -606 -6271 +625               imp:p=32768    
9291   8  -2.55      -606 +6271 -6272                imp:p=65536 
9292   8  -2.55      -606 +6272 -6273                imp:p=131072 
9293   8  -2.55      -606 +6273 -6274                imp:p=262144 
9294   8  -2.55      -606 +6274 -627                  imp:p=524288 
930    5  -7.92       -606 -628  +627                   imp:p=1048576  
931    4  -1.205e-3  -999 (+606:-622:+628)      imp:p=1048576  
999    0                   +999                                   imp:p=0 
 
c    -- Surface Cards -- 
c    -Fuel rod surfaces- 
102    c/z   -1.258823529 -1.258823529 0.4178                 
103    c/z   -1.258823529 -1.258823529 0.475                   
104    pz     0.0                                              
105    pz     9.1                                              
106    pz   397.2                                              
107    pz   406.3                                              
c 
c    -Lattice #1 cell surfaces- 
301    px    -0.629411765 
302    px    -1.888235294 
303    py    -0.629411765 
304    py    -1.888235294 
c 
c    -Lattice #1 boundaries and additional layers around- 
401    px    20.82519824                                       
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491    px    -0.684021765 
402    py    20.82519824 
492    py    -0.684021765 
403    px    21.22524824                                       
404    py    21.22524824 
405    px    -1.084071765  
406    py    -1.084071765 
c 
c    -Lattice #2 cell surfaces- 
408    px    21.58843574            
409    py    21.58843574 
410    px    -1.447259265 
411    py    -1.447259265 
c 
c    -Air in lattice #2- 
501   cz     50  
c 
c    -Outer cylinders- 
601    c/z   90.69552076 90.69552076 83.05637951        
602    c/z   90.69552076 90.69552076 84.40187951        
603    c/z   90.69552076 90.69552076 91.94637951        
604    c/z   90.69552076 90.69552076 94.48637951        
605    c/z   90.69552076 90.69552076 164.3363795        
606    c/z   90.69552076 90.69552076 165.1013795        
c 
c     -Top and bottom layers- 
621    pz    -6.35         
622    pz   -34.2555       
623    pz   429.59         
6231   pz   431.2981538    
6232   pz   433.0063075 
6233   pz   434.7144613 
6234   pz   436.422615 
6235   pz   438.1307688 
6236   pz   439.8389226 
6237   pz   441.5470763 
6238   pz   443.2552301 
6239   pz   444.9633838 
6240   pz   446.6715376 
6241   pz   448.3796913 
6242   pz   450.0878451 
6243   pz   451.7959989 
624    pz   453.59         
625    pz   471.59         
626    pz   463.59         
627    pz   491.59         
6271   pz   476.3514966    
6272   pz   480.5518566 
6273   pz   484.7522166 
6274   pz   488.9525766 
628    pz   494.13         




c    -Boral-SS layer- 
701    py    -0.827531765 
702    py    -0.738631765 
703    px     0.540511765 
733    py     0.629411765 
704    px    19.5117647 
744    px    19.6006647 
705    px    20.96870824 
706    px    20.87980824 
707    py     0.540511765 
777    px     0.629411765 
708    py    19.5117647 
788    py    19.6006647 
c 
c    -Problem boundary- 
999    s     90.69552076 90.69552076 0 5000  
   
c     -- Data Cards -- 
MODE p 
SDEF POS=D1 x=FPOS D2  y=FPOS D9  z=D16  ERG=D17 
SI1  L  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
            0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
            0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
            0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
            0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
            0 0 0  0 0 0 
SP1  D  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
             1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DS2  S  3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5  
             6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8  
SI3  22.40628324 43.80628324 
SP3  0           1 
SI4  45.44197824 66.84197824 
SP4  0           1 
SI5  68.47767324 89.87767324 
SP5  0           1 
SI6  91.51336824 112.9133682 
SP6  0           1 
SI7  114.5490632 135.9490632 
SP7  0           1 
SI8  137.5847582 158.9847582 
SP8  0           1 
DS9  S  10 11 12 13 14 10 11 12 13 15 
             14 10 11 12 13 15 14 10 11 12 13 15 
             14 10 11 12 13 15 10 11 12 13 
SI10  45.44197824 66.84197824 
SP10  0           1 
SI11  68.47767324 89.87767324 
SP11  0           1 
SI12  91.51336824 112.9133682 
SP12  0           1 
SI13  114.5490632 135.9490632 
SP13  0           1 
85 
 
SI14  22.40628324 43.80628324 
SP14  0           1 
SI15  137.5847582 158.9847582 
SP15  0           1 
SI16  9.1 397.2 
SP16  0   1 
SI17  0        2.00E-02 3.00E-02 4.50E-02 7.00E-02  
         1.00E-01 1.50E-01 3.00E-01 4.50E-01 7.00E-01  
         1.00E+00 1.50E+00 2.00E+00 2.50E+00 3.00E+00 
         4.00E+00 6.00E+00 8.00E+00 1.10E+01 
SP17  0 5.79E+15 1.27E+15 1.43E+15 1.05E+15 
          7.77E+14 1.01E+15 7.38E+14 3.94E+14 5.83E+15 
          1.83E+15 2.71E+14 2.23E+13 2.40E+13 5.46E+11 
          4.98E+10 1.87E+07 2.16E+06 2.48E+05 2.04E+16 
m1    92234.01p  0.00006     $Fuel  
         92235.01p  0.039 
         92238.01p  0.96094 
           8016.01p  2 
m2    50000.01p  1.5         $Cladding 
         26000.01p  0.2 
         24000.01p  0.1 
         28000.01p  0.007 
         40000.01p  98.193       
m3     2004.01p -4.519E-3    $Mixture for top and bottom plenums 
        50000.01p -0.019453          
        26000.01p -0.00122 
        24000.01p -0.000568 
        28000.01p -4.48857E-5 
        40000.01p -0.978668       
m4     6000.01p  0.000151    $Air 
          7014.01p  0.784437     
          8016.01p  0.210750     
        18000.01p  0.004671     
m5   24000.01p  0.202087    $ MPC grid material 
        25055.01p  0.020133     
        26000.01p  0.688268     
        28000.01p  0.089514     
m6    13027.01p -0.6861      $ Boral 
           6000.01p -0.0682 
           5010.01p -0.044226 
           5011.01p -0.201474 
m7     6012.01p  0.022831    $Carbon steal 
        26000.01p  0.977170 
m8    14000.01p -0.315        $Concrete  
         13027.01p -0.048  
           8016.01p -0.5  
           1001.01p -0.006 
         11023.01p -0.017  
         20000.01p -0.083  
         26000.01p -0.012 





RADIATION SOURCE-TERM FOR THE ONE PWR SNF ASSEMBLY 
 
Gamma Energy Groups and Their Respective Source Strengths 
# Energy group  Energy group boundaries, (MeV) Production rate, (γ·s-1·MeV-1) 
1 0.00E+00 - 2.00E-02 5.79E+15 
2 2.00E-02  - 3.00E-02 1.27E+15 
3 3.00E-02  - 4.50E-02 1.43E+15 
4 4.50E-02  - 7.00E-02 1.05E+15 
5 7.00E-02  - 1.00E-01 7.77E+14 
6 1.00E-01  - 1.50E-01 1.01E+15 
7 1.50E-01  - 3.00E-01 7.38E+14 
8 3.00E-01  - 4.50E-01 3.94E+14 
9 4.50E-01  - 7.00E-01 5.83E+15 
10 7.00E-01  - 1.00E+00 1.83E+15 
11 1.00E+00 - 1.50E+00 2.71E+14 
12 1.50E+00 - 2.00E+00 2.23E+13 
13 2.00E+00 - 2.50E+00 2.40E+13 
14 2.50E+00 - 3.00E+00 5.46E+11 
15 3.00E+00 - 4.00E+00 4.98E+10 
16 4.00E+00 - 6.00E+00 1.87E+07 
17 6.00E+00 - 8.00E+00 2.16E+06 
18 8.00E+00 - 1.10E+01 2.48E+05 
















Neutron Energy Groups and Their Respective Productions Rates 
# Energy group Energy group boundaries, (MeV) Production rate, (n·s-1·MeV-1) 
1 3.000E-09 - 1.000E-11 2.92E-05 
2 7.500E-09 - 3.000E-09 7.85E-05 
3 1.000E-08 - 7.500E-09 5.61E-05 
4 2.530E-08 - 1.000E-08 4.81E-04 
5 3.000E-08 - 2.530E-08 1.86E-04 
6 4.000E-08 - 3.000E-08 4.45E-04 
7 5.000E-08 - 4.000E-08 5.04E-04 
8 7.000E-08 - 5.000E-08 1.16E-03 
9 1.000E-07 - 7.000E-08 2.07E-03 
10 1.500E-07 - 1.000E-07 4.19E-03 
11 2.000E-07 - 1.500E-07 4.97E-03 
12 2.250E-07 - 2.000E-07 2.74E-03 
13 2.500E-07 - 2.250E-07 2.90E-03 
14 2.750E-07 - 2.500E-07 3.05E-03 
15 3.250E-07 - 2.750E-07 6.51E-03 
16 3.500E-07 - 3.250E-07 3.45E-03 
17 3.750E-07 - 3.500E-07 3.58E-03 
18 4.000E-07 - 3.750E-07 3.70E-03 
19 6.250E-07 - 4.000E-07 3.82E-02 
20 1.000E-06 - 6.250E-07 8.01E-02 
21 1.770E-06 - 1.000E-06 2.15E-01 
22 3.000E-06 - 1.770E-06 4.50E-01 
23 4.750E-06 - 3.000E-06 8.16E-01 
24 6.000E-06 - 4.750E-06 6.87E-01 
25 8.100E-06 - 6.000E-06 1.32E+00 
26 1.000E-05 - 8.100E-06 1.36E+00 
27 3.000E-05 - 1.000E-05 2.10E+01 
28 1.000E-04 - 3.000E-05 1.33E+02 
29 5.500E-04 - 1.000E-04 1.89E+03 
30 3.000E-03 - 5.500E-04 2.40E+04 
31 1.700E-02 - 3.000E-03 3.24E+05 
32 2.500E-02 - 1.700E-02 2.73E+05 
33 1.000E-01 - 2.500E-02 4.26E+06 
34 4.000E-01 - 1.000E-01 3.07E+07 
35 9.000E-01 - 4.000E-01 6.71E+07 
36 1.400E+00 - 9.000E-01 6.70E+07 
37 1.850E+00 -1.400E+00 5.36E+07 
38 2.354E+00 -1.850E+00 5.03E+07 
39 2.479E+00 - 2.354E+00 1.09E+07 
40 3.000E+00 - 2.479E+00 3.87E+07 
41 4.800E+00 - 3.000E+00 7.06E+07 
42 6.434E+00 - 4.800E+00 2.02E+07 
43 8.187E+00 - 6.434E+00 6.43E+06 
44 2.000E+01 - 8.187E+00 2.22E+06 
















MCNP INPUT FILE FOR THE SIMPLIFIED DRY CASK MODEL 
 
c     -- Cell Cards -- 
924    4  -1.205e-3  -601 -623  +107                                                 imp:n=1        
925    5  -7.92         -601 -624  +623                                                 imp:n=1        
926    4  -1.205e-3  -601 -625  +624 #201 #202 #203                      imp:n=1        
929    8  -2.55         -601 -627  +625                                                 imp:n=1        
930    5  -7.92         -601 -628  +627                                                 imp:n=1        
201    9  -0.93         -201 +202 -203 +204 +624 -205 #202 #203    imp:n=1        
202    0                   -206 -208 +209                                                  imp:n=1        
203    0                   -207 -208 +209                                                  imp:n=1        
931    0                   -999 (+601:-107:+628)                                      imp:n=0        
999    0                  +999                                                                    imp:n=0        
 
c    -- Surface Cards -- 
107    pz   406.3 
c 
c    -Outer cylinders- 
601    c/z   90.69552076 90.69552076 83.05637951        
c 
c     -Top and bottom layers- 
623    pz   429.59         
624    pz   453.59         
625    pz   471.59         
627    pz   491.59         
628    pz   494.13         
201    px   113.6955208 
202    px   67.69552076 
203    py   113.6955208 
204    py   67.69552076 
205    pz   460.39 
206    c/y  102.2133682 456.99 2.4 
207    c/y  79.17767324 456.99 2.4 
208    py   102.1955208 
209    py   79.19552076 
c 
c    -Problem boundary- 
999    s     90.69552076 90.69552076 0 20000   
   
c     -- Data Cards -- 
MODE n 
SSR  OLD=107 NEW=107 PTY=N 
f4:n    202 
f14:n  203 
fm4    1.76E+11 
fm14  1.76E+11 




m4     6000.66c  0.000151     $Air                                       
          7014.66c  0.784437                                               
           8016.66c  0.210750                                                 
         18000.35c  0.004671                                                 
m5    24000.50c  0.202087    $ Stainless Steel 
         25055.50c  0.020133                                                    
         26000.50c  0.688268                                                    
         28000.50c  0.089514                                                    
m8    14000.50c -0.315           $Concrete                                           
         13027.66c -0.048                                                           
           8016.66c -0.5                                                             
            1001.66c -0.006                                                           
          11023.66c -0.017                                                           
          20000.66c -0.083                                                           
          26000.50c -0.012                                                           
          19000.66c -0.019 
m9     1001.66c -0.143716      $Polyethylene 
           6012.50c -0.856284 
NPS   1E8 







DIVERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR THE FISSION CHAMBERS IN 
GRAPHICAL FORM AND RELATED NUMERICAL DATA 
 
 
Fission chamber readings for the diversion scenarios #1-5 where one SNF assembly was 
removed. Measurement time – 1 (s) 
 
  
Fission chamber readings for the diversion scenarios #6-8 where two SNF were removed. 
















































Fission chamber readings for the open lid case. Measurement time – 1 (s) 
 
 





















































Fission chamber readings and related uncertainty for diversion analysis results with 
neutron radiation signal and one SNF assembly removed 
Measurement time 1 (s) RR DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 
Counts (mean) 1.01E+04 9.48E+03 9.33E+03 9.51E+03 9.56E+03 9.53E+03 
MCNP uncertainty 1.45E+02 1.32E+02 1.31E+02 1.35E+02 1.33E+02 1.31E+02 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
1.01E+02 9.74E+01 9.66E+01 9.75E+01 9.78E+01 9.76E+01 
Total uncertainty 1.77E+02 1.64E+02 1.63E+02 1.66E+02 1.65E+02 1.64E+02 
      
 
Measurement time 30 (s) RR DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 
Counts (mean) 3.04E+05 2.84E+05 2.80E+05 2.85E+05 2.87E+05 2.86E+05 
MCNP uncertainty 1.45E+02 1.32E+02 1.31E+02 1.35E+02 1.33E+02 1.31E+02 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
5.51E+02 5.33E+02 5.29E+02 5.34E+02 5.35E+02 5.35E+02 
Total uncertainty 5.70E+02 5.49E+02 5.45E+02 5.51E+02 5.52E+02 5.51E+02 
 
Fission chamber readings and related uncertainty for diversion analysis results with 
neutron radiation signal for two SNF assemblies removed and open lid scenario 
Measurement time 1 (s) RR DS6 DS7 DS8 DS0 (Open lid) 
Counts (mean) 1.01E+04 9.31E+03 8.88E+03 9.01E+03 3.78E+03 
MCNP uncertainty 1.45E+02 1.33E+02 1.27E+02 1.27E+02 9.45E+01 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
1.01E+02 9.65E+01 9.42E+01 9.49E+01 6.15E+01 
Total uncertainty 1.77E+02 1.65E+02 1.58E+02 1.59E+02 1.13E+02 
      
Measurement time 30 (s) RR DS6 DS7 DS8 DS0 (Open lid) 
Neutron flux value (mean) 3.04E+05 2.79E+05 2.66E+05 2.70E+05 1.13E+05 
MCNP uncertainty 1.45E+02 1.33E+02 1.27E+02 1.27E+02 9.45E+01 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
5.51E+02 5.28E+02 5.16E+02 5.20E+02 3.37E+02 







DIVERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR THE IONIZATION CHAMBERS IN 
GRAPHICAL FORM AND RELATED NUMERICAL DATA 
 
 
Central ionization chamber readings for the diversion scenarios #1-5 where one SNF assembly 
was removed and for open lid scenario 
 
Edge ionization chamber readings for the diversion scenarios #1-5 where one SNF assembly was 


























































Diversion analyses results for the ionization chamber located in the center position  
(two assemblies removed) 
 
 
Diversion analyses results for the ionization chamber located in the edge position  
















































Ionization chamber readings and related uncertainty for diversion analysis results with 
gamma radiation signal and one SNF assembly removed 
Central location RR DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 
Exposure rate (mean) 6.110 5.583 5.945 5.784 5.455 5.871 
MCNP uncertainty 0.379 0.296 0.325 0.322 0.295 0.315 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
0.306 0.279 0.297 0.289 0.273 0.294 
Total uncertainty 0.487 0.407 0.440 0.433 0.401 0.431 
       
Edge location RR DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 
Counts (mean) 9.676 8.126 9.982 9.828 8.289 9.981 
MCNP uncertainty 0.368 0.395 0.451 0.384 0.399 0.451 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
0.484 0.406 0.499 0.491 0.414 0.499 
Total uncertainty 0.608 0.567 0.673 0.624 0.575 0.673 
 
Ionization chamber readings and related uncertainty for diversion analysis results with 
gamma radiation signal for two SNF assemblies removed and open lid scenario 
Central location RR DS6 DS7 DS8 DS0 (Open lid) 
Exposure rate (mean) 6.110 5.464 5.798 6.012 3.735 
MCNP uncertainty 0.379 0.344 0.366 0.370 0.247 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
0.306 0.273 0.290 0.301 0.187 
Total uncertainty 0.487 0.439 0.467 0.477 0.310 
 
     
Edge location RR DS6 DS7 DS8 DS0 (Open lid) 
Exposure rate (mean) 9.676 7.881 10.361 9.962 5.139 
MCNP uncertainty 0.368 0.336 0.515 0.494 0.280 
Virtual measurement 
uncertainty 
0.484 0.394 0.518 0.498 0.257 
Total uncertainty 0.608 0.518 0.730 0.702 0.380 
 
 
